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INTRODUCTION
This discussion is best begun with a story:
Kim (pseudonym) and her husband worked for the same large
computer company. Kim's husband abused her at home and at
work. One afternoon, he chased Kim down a hallway at work
and assaulted her. Kim fled to a supervisor and told her that
she was attacked in the office. In the next few days, Kim ob-
tained a restraining order against her husband that included
the workplace and told her employer about it, believing that
the employer would enforce it in the workplace. At first, Kim
was hopeful when the human resources director at her com-
pany met with her and then with her husband, assuring Kim
that everything would be "taken care of"; however, no action
was taken against her husband. A few weeks [later], Kim's hus-
band assaulted her again at work, and she called the police
who arrested him. Two days later, again failing to take any
disciplinary action against her husband, the company
revictimized Kim by firing her for "crying in the lobby."1
Stories like Kim's are not unique. It was fortunate that no one else
was harmed by Kim's abuser, but in many cases, the domestic violence
spills over into the workplace, and the abuser harms not only his victim
but other employees as well. Regardless of who commits the violence,
examples of workplace violence abound.2 Reports of violence in the
workplace have put the phrase "workplace violence" at the tip of every-
one's tongue. Many fear employees "going postal" (a derogatory phrase
derived from the string of murders in post office locations around the
country). Employers are especially concerned with the phenomenon of
1. Robin R. Runge & Marcellene E. Hearn, Employment Rights Advocacy for Domestic
Violence Victims, 5(2) DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORT 17-18, 26-29 (DEc/JAN 2000),
reprinted in NANCY K. D. LEMON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW, (West Group Publish-
ing 2001), at 821-22.
2. See Larry Silver, Deadly Rampages: How to Predict Them, How to Prevent Them, Bulle-
tin to Management (July, 24, 2004) (reporting recent incidents of deadly workplace
violence).
3. Kristine L. Hayes, Prepostal Prevention of Workplace Violence: Establishing an Ombuds
Program as One Possible Solution, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 215 (1998); Vicki
A. Laden & Gregory Schwartz, Psychiatric Disabilities, the Americans with Disabilities
Act, and the New Workplace Violence Account, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 246,
249 (2000). In fact, the word "postal" has been used as an acronym for preventing
and predicting workplace violence. P.O.S.T.A.L. stands for profile + observable warn-
ing signs + shotgun + triggering event = always lethal. See Silver, supra note 2.
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workplace violence, which seems to become more common with every
passing day. So what is the truth about workplace violence? The truth is
that homicide is the second leading cause of death in the workplace.4
One out of six violent crimes occurs in the workplace.5 Every day, work-
place crimes are responsible for three deaths and sixty-one serious
injuries.6 Finally, two million American workers are victims of workplace
violence each year.7
Savvy employers know that violence can come from anywhere, even
from the private lives of their employees. These employers know that the
private abuse suffered by one of their employees could spill over into the
workplace, causing harm to not only the abuser's victim, but other em-
ployees as well.8 There are two ways that domestic violence affects the
workplace. First, the personal violence in a relationship is bound to spill
over into the workplace because it is impossible for victims to put the
violence at home out of their mind when they are at work.9 Second, and
more importantly for purposes of this discussion, because a woman's
hours on the job are often predictable, the woman's abuser can readily
find her at work and continue the harassment there. "Because job sites
are such easy targets for batterers, the abuse literally follows women into
the workplace, creating an inescapable dilemma for victims and making
their offices or worksites no safer than their violent homes." 0
Domestic violence occurs in the workplace more frequently than
one might presume." Workplace violence is the number one cause of
death for women in the workplace 2 in part because of domestic violence
spillover, where an abuser harms his victim as well as any co-workers
who try to intervene. 3 In one tragic situation, a barterer dragged his
4. Stephen J. Beaver, Comment, Beyond the Exclusivity Rule: Employer's Liability for
Workplace Violence, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 103, 103 (1997); Dianne R Layden, Work-
place Violence: Frontier Justice on the Job, 23 LEGAL STUD. FORUM 479, 479 (1999).
5. Beaver, supra note 4, at 103.
6. Id.
7. OSHA FACT SHEET, WORcPIACE VIOLENCE, available at http://www.osha.gov [here-
inafter OSHA FACT SHEET] (2002).
8. Frances E. Zollers & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Workplace Violence and Security: Are
There Lessons for Peacemaking?, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L 449, 455 (2003).
9. Jill C. Robertson, Addressing Domestic Violence in the Workplace: An Employer's Re-
sponsibility, 16 LAW & INEQ. J. 633, 637 (1998).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Ann Hayes, Wayne N. Outten & Richard L. Steer, Playing the Psychiatric
Odds: Can We Protect the Public by Predicting Dangerous? Symposium Speeches Work-
place Violence: Prediction and Prevention, 20 PACE L. REv. 297, 311-12 (2000);
Layden, supra note 4, at 480.
12. Hayes, supra note 3, at 216.
13. Hayes, Outten & Steer, supra note 11, at 298-99; Lea B. Vaughn, Symposium on
Integrating Responses to Domestic Violence: Victimized Twice-The Intersection of
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wife (the employee) into the parking lot and set her on fire. If one of her
co-workers had intervened, the violence could have escalated.' 4 A sub-
stantial portion of the battered women each year are abused in the
workplace because it is easy for batterers to find their victims at work.'
5
The conflict between domestic violence and the workplace is often
exposed in its rawest state when a victim of domestic violence is consid-
ered to be a threat to the workplace by her employer. If an employer has
a workplace violence policy, the employer will likely address the situa-
tion pursuant to that policy. The presence of a policy both affects and
informs the issue of domestic violence in the workplace.
For those employers who take workplace violence seriously 6 the is-
sue of domestic violence in the workplace leads to an unavoidable
conflict.' 7 In order to understand how the scenario of domestic violence
in the workplace interacts and often conflicts with an employer's work-
place violence policy, consider the following hypothetical.
A hospital in a rural area in middle-America learns that one of its fe-
male employees had been victimized by her live-in boyfriend. After a
particularly hostile beating the hospital learns of the domestic violence be-
cause the employee must call in sick. She also requests time off to appear in
court to testify against her boyfriend. Minutes before the hearing, she changes
her mind, and decides not to press charges. She also refiuses to testify and re-
turns to the home she shares with her boyfriend. Through the hospital's
investigation (conducted by the human resources team with the help of a
psychologist trained in domestic and workplace violence),'9 the hospital
Domestic Violence and the Workplace: Legal Reform through Curriculum Development,
47 Loy. L. REv. 231, 231 (2001).
14. Hayes, Outten & Steer, supra note 11, at 298-99.
15. Amy D. Whitten & Deanne M. Mosley, Caught in the Crossfire: Employer's Liability
for Workplace Violence, 70 Miss. L. J. 505, 506 (2000).
16. I define this as having a policy that not only prohibits violence in the workplace, but
actually has mechanisms in place to try to predict and prevent violence.
17. See Robert J. Grossman, Bulletproof Practices, 47 HR MAGAZINE, No. 11 (Nov.
2002); Robert F. Lonte, They Never Saw It Coming-An Employer's Guide for Reduc-
ing Stress and Violence in the Workplace, see also Layden, supra note 4, at 486, 502
(recommending training and threat assessment procedures); OSHA FACT SHEET, su-
pra note 7 (recommending a zero-tolerance policies and training).
18. This hypothetical, which varies from the introductory hypothetical, will be used
throughout this Article to analyze various issues.
19. Many employers with progressive workplace violence policies will establish a commit-
tee to train, investigate, and deal with potential and real threats of violence in the
workplace. See Grossman, supra note 17. Because the study of workplace violence of-
ten involves an interdisciplinary approach, this committee should ideally include
human resources personnel, employment attorneys, occupational safety and health
experts, and psychology experts. See Layden, supra note 4, at 480; Grossman, supra
note 17; see also THE NATIONAL WORKPLACE RESOURCE CENTER ON DOMESTIC VIO-
[Vol. 12:275
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learns that the domestic violence had been ongoing for some time, and was
fairly severe. The hospital also learns that the abuser possessed at least one
weapon. The hospital's concern, of course, is the possibility that the domestic
violence would spill over into the workplace.
The hospital imagines and fears the worst-case scenario, where the em-
ployee leaves her home to go to work after afight, and her abuser follows her
to work to finish the fight. The employer's concern is escalated by the fact
that the hospital is a public place and is easily accessible. The hospital is not
only concerned about the employee's boyfriend attacking the employee, but
injuring other employees or patients as well, either because they attempt to
intervene, or because they are the unlucky recipients ofa stray bullet.
When the human resources team consults with the psychologist, it learns
about the cycles of domestic violence and how unlikely it is for an abuser to
voluntarily stop the abuse without the intervention of police, jail time,
and/or therapy. The team also learns why it is unlikely that the female em-
ployee who is being abused will voluntarily leave her batterer, as was already
evidenced by her decision to not press charges against him and to go back to
the home they shared.
Hence, the hospital is in a very precarious situation. It knows that there
is a real risk of the violence spilling over into the workplace if it keeps the
female employee employed. It is unsure if it has the capability to adequately
protect against that risk, especially because she has been unwilling to accept
her employer's help. Many of the more aggressive protective measures it could
take involve significant and overly burdensome financial expenditures. The
hospital also considers retaining the female employee with the stipulation
that she will leave her abusive boyfriend. However, she refrses to leave him,
and they know that she is unlikely to change her mind.
Accordingly, the hospital makes the very difficult decision to terminate
the female employee. It does not make this decision lightly as the decision
seems inherently unfair and wrong. But weighing the potential risk of a
lawsuit by the terminated female employee against the risk of the very sig-
nificant liability not to mention calamity, of a violent outburst in the
workplace, the hospital determines that it has no choice but to terminate the
female employee.
LENCE, THE WORKPLACE RESPONDS: A Resource Guide for Employers, Unions and
Advocates (2002), at 88 [hereinafter THE WORKPLACE RESPONDS]. The committee is
responsible for gathering pertinent information from employees, supervisors, person-
nel files, background checks, and sometimes even family members. See Zollers &
Callahan, supra note 8, at 469-70 (noting the need for crisis management teams).
Some committees include a forensic psychologist whose responsibilities include con-
ducting a fitness for duty or threat assessment on the individual. Grossman, supra
note 17.
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The initial reaction of most people when hearing of this hypotheti-
cal is nothing short of outrage because the employer unfairly punished
the victim of domestic violence; in other words, it "victimized the
abused., 20 However, many employers assume that it would be very
unlikely for the employee-victim 21 to fashion a cause of action against
the employer and consider the issue as simply a policy decision, albeit a
very difficult one.22 This Article will explore both the wisdom and the
fairness of the hypothetical employer's decision to terminate the abused
employee from both a doctrinal and normative perspective.
In doing so, this Article will seek to answer questions that inform
this issue, such as: Is termination a legally "safe" decision or is it at least
safer than the alternative (not terminating and violence ensues)? From a
normative perspective, what should an employer do in this situation and
which policy interests inform its decision? Should the employer further
"victimize the abused" by terminating her to protect the workplace, or
does the inherent unfairness of terminating the employee-victim trump
the safety concerns of the rest of the workplace? Or is there a middle
ground that should be explored? In answering these questions, I hope to
raise the reader's awareness of both sides of the debate and hopefully
spur further discussion of this issue."
Part I of this article will discuss domestic violence, explaining the
dynamics of domestic violence in an effort to shed light on why it is so
difficult for a battered woman to leave the abusive relationship. This
understanding is necessary for a sensitive and informed decision-making
process. This Part will also discuss the magnitude of the effect that do-
mestic violence has on the workplace. Part II will discuss a company's
potential legal liability for: (a) wrongfully terminating the employee-
victim and (b) failing to protect other employees (including, perhaps,
the employee-victim herself) if the company does not terminate the em-
ployee-victim and violence ensues. This part will explore the many
20. See THE WORKPLACE RESPONDS, supra note 19, at 28 (" 'Victim-Blaming' (attributing
the cause for the abuse to the victim) or demands for change (such as telling the em-
ployee to leave the batterer immediately) are not supportive or effective responses to
domestic violence situations and may even unintentionally harm the victim.").
21. I will refer to an employee who is the victim of domestic violence as the "employee-
victim."
22. See Vaughn, supra note 13, at 233 ("To the extent that there are emerging legal
remedies, they are not coordinated and they are piecemeal reactions to discrete factual
situations. This means that a victim of abuse who wishes to challenge violence- or
abuse-related decisions of her employer is faced with uncertain remedies and uneven
results.").
23. While a handful of articles have been written regarding domestic violence in the




possible causes of action that the terminated employee may or may not
bring, and will also explore an employer's obligation to protect its em-
ployees against workplace violence. Part III will explore the decision
from a normative perspective, and will seek to answer such questions as:
Can an employer justify its decision to punish the victim of domestic
violence? Should it matter if the female employee was unwilling to help
herself or take help from the employer? Are there other less severe alter-
natives an employer could take? Finally, perhaps the most important
question: whose rights should trump? In other words, is it the right de-
cision to sacrifice one woman's employment in order to protect the rest
of the workforce against the potential risk of harm? If so, how signifi-
cant should the harm be before such a decision is made?
Finally, Part IV will offer this author's solutions to dealing with
these very difficult issues. Even though there are circumstances where
termination is justified (a conclusion that will be supported below), in
this hypothetical, termination was unwarranted. My conclusions draw
analogies to the law of the Americans with Disabilities Act to support
my proposal that employers should use a direct threat analysis as well as
concepts such as reasonable accommodation and undue burden to ana-
lyze the conflict between a company's interest in having a safe workplace
and the spillover of domestic violence into the workplace. Because, as I
conclude, there was not a significant threat of harm to the workplace in
the hypothetical, termination cannot be justified.
I. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND ITS EFFECT ON THE WORKPLACE
In order to later analyze the legal and policy issues involved in the
decision of whether or not to terminate the employee-victim when there
is a risk of the violence entering the workplace, it is important to have a
basic understanding of domestic violence, why it happens, and why
seemingly nothing can be done about it. This part will also explore the
effect domestic violence has on the workplace.
A. Understanding Domestic Violence
The statistics of domestic violence are frightening; "l[t] here are four
million reported instances of domestic violence every year., 24 For 1,500
women each year, the violence results in death. 25 The vast majority of
24. DAWN BRADLEY BERRY, J.D. THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SOURCEBOOK 6 (3d ed. 2000).
25. Id. at 7.
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the time, the death occurs after prior incidents of domestic violence. In
fact, the average death victim makes eight prior calls to report domestic
violence.26 For those who may question why a woman would allow her-
self to be beaten at least eight times,27 leaving is not as safe (or as easy, as
will be discussed below) as some might think. "Women who are di-
vorced or separated from abusers report being battered fourteen times
[more frequently than] those still living with their [abusers] .,,28
There are two very common misconceptions about this troubling
social problem. The first misconception about domestic violence is that
the woman is weak or masochistic because she does not leave the abusive
relationship.29 Understanding some common domestic violence theories,
such as learned helplessness and the battered women's syndrome should
assist the uninformed reader in understanding why it is so difficult for
women to leave the relationship. In order to do this, it is important to
understand the cycles of the domestic violence relationship.
In two-thirds of violent homes, the couples travel through three
phases. First, tension increases between the couple. As he becomes more
critical and irritable, she becomes more nervous and passive in an effort
to keep the abuse from worsening.3 However, her passive behavior may
have the reverse effect of justifying his perceived superiority. "Usually,
both [partners] can sense the impending loss of control and [they both]
become more desperate, which only fuels the tension.""
The second stage is the violent outburst. Anything can cause the ex-
plosion and she may not even be present when something triggers his
anger, which should serve to dispel another common (albeit outrageous)
myth that the woman somehow "deserves" to be beaten. Sometimes, the
woman is sleeping or arriving home when her batterer becomes enraged.32
26. Id.
27. Quite possibly, the woman is beaten more than eight times and did not report all of
the beatings. See id.
28. Id. It is possible that there might be more reporting among members of this group
because they do not have the shame of admitting that they are still living with their
abusers.
29. See THE WoRulAcE RESPONDS, supra note 19, at 34 (stating that supervisors be-
come frustrated when an employee returns to her batterer or stays in an abusive
relationship). There are many explanations for why a woman may not leave the rela-
tionship, including fear for her safety or the safety of her children, financial concerns
(which, of course, are exacerbated if the employee is terminated by the employer), her
love for him and her guilt for allowing herself to be in the situation in the first place.
See id.
30. BERRY, supra note 24, at 35-36.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 35-37.
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After the battering, the man repents with "loving contrition," which
brings "profound relief for both parties." He will apologize, ask for for-
giveness, and shower her with attention, gifts and love. He also promises
to change, which in part explains why many women stay. She believes he
is sincere and really will change.33 Dr. Leonore Walker, renowned domes-
tic violence expert, "believes that this phase may be the most
psychologically victimizing, because it perpetuates the illusion of interde-
pendence-he depends on her for forgiveness; she depends on the 'real'
man coming back."34 Psychologists have also applied the theory of "trau-
matic bonding" to battered women, which offers another explanation of
her decision to forgive the man who beat her. 5 This theory posits that
"because the abuse leaves the victim emotionally and physically drained
and in desperate need of some human support and care, ... [s] he is likely
to respond to the batterer's apologies and affection after the abuse."36
As the cycle repeats itself, the woman continues to deny the exis-
tence or the severity of the battering, believing that the last beating was
the final one and that her abuser will change. But usually the cycle of
violence continues and often escalates.37 "Behavioral scientists have long
known that the best way to change behavior is through intermittent re-
inforcement- occasional, unpredictable rewards. The barterer, who
intersperses abuse with loving acts, courtship, and gifts is unwittingly
using one of the most powerful techniques for convincing the woman to
stay with him." 8
By understanding the cycles, it is easier for one to understand the
learned helplessness theory, which might also explain why many women
stay.39 The "learned helplessness" theory ° states that if you trap a subject
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. EDWARD GONDOLF & ELLEN FISHER, THE SURVIVOR THEORY, BATTERED WOMEN AS
SuRvivoRs: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 11-18, 20-24
(Lexington Books, 1988), reprinted in LEMON, supra note 1, at 83.
36. Id.
37. BERRY, supra note 24, at 37.
38. Id.
39. But see Mary Ann Dutton & Catherine L. Waltz, Domestic Violence: Understanding
Why it Happens and How to Recognize It, 17 WTR FAM. ADvoc. 14-18 (Winter,
1995), reprinted in LEMON, supra note 1, at 70-71 (arguing that asking the question
of "why she stays" is less productive than, and deflects attention from, the real issue
of how she responded to the violence); see also Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 40-41
(1991) (critiquing the learned helplessness theory).
40. This theory was identified by psychologist Martin Seligman of the University of
Pennsylvania and is used by Dr. Walker and others working with battered women.
BERRY, supra note 24, at 37; see also LEONORE E. WALKER, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY OF LEARNED HELPLESSNESS, THE BATTERED WOMAN 44-54 (Harper &
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without the possibility of escape and subject it to unpredictable abuse,
the normal escape mechanisms disappear, and the victim believes escape
is impossi 1e.
The theory posits that people try to control their environment by
engaging in and avoiding behaviors, depending on the outcome those
behaviors created in the past.42 If we like a particular outcome, we are
likely to repeat the behavior that resulted in the pleasurable outcome.
Conversely, if our behavior creates a negative outcome, we are likely to
avoid the behavior in the future. However, if the outcome of our behav-
ior cannot be predicted, as it often cannot in abusive relationships, we
feel as if we have lost the ability to control our lives.43
A battered woman has come to believe that the abuse is an un-
avoidable part of her life so she learns to cope with it rather than escape.
She does not actually learn to be helpless but she does learn "that she
cannot predict the effect of her behavior, so she must develop new cop-
ing skills."44 She does things that give her predictability because familiar
demons are better to her than the unfamiliar. Batterers engage in behav-
ior similar to the brainwashing techniques used in the Nazi
concentration camps, where the Nazis engaged in "psychological torture,
including isolation, monopolization of perception, induced exhaustion
and debility, threats, occasional indulgences, demonstrations of com-
plete power, degradation and humiliation, and enforcing trivial
demands."45 Many battered women believe that their abusers are capable
of "finding them no matter where they go."46 Of course, some abusers
Row, 1979), reprinted in LEMON, supra note 1, at 74-75. This theory is not the only
theory advanced to explain why women stay. Some scholars criticize the learned help-
lessness theory and argue that domestic violence victims often have few viable options
if they want to stay safe and keep their children safe. Mahoney, supra note 39, at 41.
41. BERRY, supra note 24, at 37.
42. Id. This theory was first tested on dogs that were locked in cages where they periodi-
cally experienced shocks from the floor of the cage. At first, they tried to escape but,
eventually, they stopped trying to escape and instead devised coping mechanisms that
were unhealthy and bizarre, such as lying in their own excrement for insulation or
curling into uncomfortable positions on the floor where the shocks were the weakest.
Even when the doors were eventually opened, the dogs did not initially leave; they
had to be retrained to have the normal escape response. Although thought is a distin-
guishing feature between humans and dogs, the physical and mental response
between battered women and these abused dogs is similar. Id.
43. WALKER, supra note 40, at 74.
44. BERRY, supra note 24, at 38.
45. BERRY, supra note 24, at 38; see also WALKER, supra note 40, at 77.
46. BERRY, supra note 24, at 39; see also WALKER, supra note 40, at 76.
Once we believe we cannot control what happens to us, it is difficult to be-
lieve we can ever influence it, even if later we experience a favorable
outcome. This concept is important for understanding why battered
[Vol. 12:275
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do find their victims wherever they go. This is why some scholars offer
alternative explanations to the learned helplessness theory. Professor
Martha Mahoney argues that many women try to escape without suc-
cess and only become helpless after they have energetically pursued
safety and have not succeeded.47
In addition to learned helplessness, many battered women suffer
from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which, in the case of bat-
tered women, is sometimes referred to as the Battered Women's
Syndrome. "People who experience severe and unexpected trauma or
repeated, unpredictable exposure to abuse often develop psychological
symptoms that may affect their ability to function long after the original
trauma is over."48 This can lead to PTSD. "This type of psychological
injury is often seen in people who have suffered prolonged isolation and
mistreatment in an abnormal situation," such as war and other hostage
situations.4 ' Experts see Battered Womens Syndrome as a subcategory of
PTSD. °
For a clinical diagnosis of Battered Women's Syndrome, four crite-
ria must be met: (1) a traumatic stressor, such as spousal abuse, exists;
women do not attempt to free themselves from a battering relationship.
Once the women are operating from a belief of helplessness, the perception
becomes reality and they become passive, submissive, "helpless." They al-
low things that appear to them to be out of their control actually to get out
of their control. When one listens to descriptions of battering incidents
from battered women, it often seems as if these women were not actually as
helpless as they perceived themselves to be. However, their behavior was
determined by the negative cognitive set, or their perceptions of what they
could or could not do, not by what actually existed.
See WALKER, supra note 40, at 76 (emphasis added). But see Gondolf & Fisher, supra
note 35, at 85-86 (advancing the survivor theory as an alternative to the learned
helplessness theory):
The alternative characterization of battered women is that they are active
survivors rather than helpless victims .... [B]attered women remain in
abusive situations not because they have been passive but because they have
tried to escape with no avail. We offer, therefore, a survivor hypothesis that
contradicts the assumptions of learned helplessness: Battered women in-
crease their helpseeking in the face of increased violence, rather than
decrease helpseeking as learned helplessness would suggest. More specifi-
cally, we contend that helpseeking is likely to increase as wife abuse, child
abuse, and the batterer's antisocial ... behavior increase.
Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
47. Mahoney, supra note 39, at 41. Mahoney also criticizes learned helplessness theory
because she believes it contributes to stereotyping of victims of domestic violence.
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(2) the individual feels a loss of control by experiencing past traumatic
events without consciously thinking about them, such as in the form of
nightmares, flashbacks, and intrusive thoughts about the past event; (3)
the person feels numbness of emotions and avoidance of anything that
reminds the person of the abuse; and (4) there is the "presence of two or
more specific symptoms indicating a higher than normal arousal re-
sponse, such as generalized anxiety, panic attacks, phobias, sexual
problems, hyper vigilance to cues of further violence .... suspiciousness,
sleep problems, irritability, and outbursts of anger."5 While some ex-
perts do not believe the woman who suffers from Battered Women's
Syndrome is disabled,52 there is some indication from the criteria listed
above that PTSD may actually qualify as a disability under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, as will be discussed further below."
An understanding of both learned helplessness and the Battered
Women's Syndrome should serve to dispel the myth that abused women
are either masochistic or weak because they do not leave their batterers.54
Furthermore, even if a woman does leave the relationship, she will not
always be safe from abuse. This is the other major misconception sur-
rounding domestic violence. "A battered woman is more likely to get
killed when she tries to leave than at any other time in the relation-
ship."55 As stated earlier, "[w]omen who have divorced or separated from
their abusers report being battered fourteen times as often as those still
living with their partners."56 The abusive man is usually highly depend-
ent on his victim for emotional support and he most likely has a very
strong fear of abandonment, which is why he often attacks the woman
when she tries to leave. The only way he can gain security against aban-
donment is through control.57 Ironically, even though the proliferation
of shelters and structures to assist women in getting protective orders
demonstrates the dangers that accompany separation, "a woman's 'fail-
ure' to permanently separate from a violent relationship is still widely
51. Id. at 56.
52. See id. at 57 ("People suffering from these disorders are not considered mentally ill,
though many psychologists feel that professional counseling is important to help the
victim fully recover and begin to enjoy life again.").
53. See infra Part II.A.5.
54. Women with children have even more difficulty leaving their batterers, not because
they are more helpless, but because they fear (often for good reason) that they will
lose their children, or they believe (erroneously perhaps) that the children are better
off with their father in their lives. Mahoney, supra note 39, at 43-46.
55. BERRY, supra note 24, at 48.
56. Id. at 7.
57. Id. at 40-41.
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held to be mysterious and in need of explanation, an indication of her
pathology rather than her batterers."58
B. Effect of Domestic Violence on the Workplace
With an understanding of the reality of domestic violence, it is
helpful to explore the effect domestic violence has on the workplace.
"Newspapers carry stories everyday about domestic violence that spills
over into the workplace. The workplace may not be a safe haven when
violence or threats of violence, come to work."59 Violent men often re-
sent their partner's work life because it is one area of her life over which
he has no control. One study found that ninety-six percent of employed
domestic violence victims surveyed experienced some type of work-
related problem due to the violence.6" Abused women miss many days of
work due to both physical and emotional consequences of the abuse.
Abuse victims are often late, and when they are there, they might be
distracted due to harassment from their abusers.61 Former U.S. Surgeon
General Dr. C. Everett Koop once said: "[Domestic violence is] an
overwhelming moral, economic, and public health burden that our
society can no longer bear. Battery is the single most significant cause of
injury to women in this country.,62
The employers' cost of this violence is staggering. It is believed
businesses lose about $100 million annually in lost wages, sick leave,
absenteeism, and non-productivity because of domestic violence.6' An-
other study reported that seventy-four percent of abused women who
work are harassed by their abusers while the woman is at work, either in
person or by telephone.64 Sixty percent of the domestic violence victims
in a Department of Labor study were disciplined and thirty percent lost
their jobs because of problems associated with domestic violence.65 Per-
haps the most depressing statistic of all: some experts estimate that
"more women leave the workforce permanently because of domestic vio-
lence than leave to raise children.
6
r
58. Mahoney, supra note 39, at 6.
59. THE WORKPLACE RESPONDS, supra note 19, at 91.
60. Runge & Hearn, supra note 1, at 822. While the statistics vary by the study, the
problem is significant regardless of which study is used.
61. BERRY, supra note 24, at 93.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 8; see also Vaughn, supra note 13, at 232.
64. BERRY, supra note 24, at 9.
65. Robertson, supra note 9, at 637-38; see also Vaughn, supra note 13, at 236.
66. BERRY, supra note 24, at 9.
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Another survey, which questioned battered women themselves,67 re-
veals that thirty-five to fifty-six percent of domestic violence victims are
harassed by their abusers at work. Sometimes, the abuser and the victim
work together, but often, the abuser does not work with his victim, but
harasses her at work.6 This same survey reported that seventy-five per-
cent of victims use company time to obtain legal and medical services,
to call shelters and counselors, or family and friends about the abuse. 9
Furthermore, this type of violence can affect more than the female
victim. A Department of Labor report notes than a domestic violence
attack can put the employee's coworkers at risk.70 Examples of this
frightening phenomenon are abundant. In one example, an employee's
ex-boyfriend called and demanded that she be fired. When the supervi-
sor refused, the ex-boyfriend threatened to kill her. The next day, he
carried out his threat at work. Prior to this incident, she had told her
employer about her personal protection order against him and her belief
that he would kill her. The company had increased security but the
guards let her abusing boyfriend right by.72 In another example, an
owner of an answering service was shot in the face when an employee's
former boyfriend showed up at work and killed her. Another co-worker
who attempted to intervene was also killed.73
Not only is domestic violence one of the leading causes of violence
at the workplace against women, but it also prevents many women from
becoming economically independent enough to escape the violence.74
Domestic violence interferes with the work life of victims in numerous
ways and frequently jeopardizes employment. A victim may need to take
off time to relocate her family, testify against her batterer in a criminal
trial, obtain medical care, or obtain a civil restraining order.75 These is-
sues often lead to termination. However, in our hypothetical, the
67. It is both possible and likely that battered women are underreporting the harassment,
which may explain the variance in statistics.
68. Maria Amelia Calaf, Breaking the Cycle: Title VII, Domestic Violence, and Work-
place Discrimination, 21 LAw & INEQ. J. 167, 170 (2003).
69. Id. at 171.
70. Vaughn, supra note 13, at 235.
71. Stephanie L. Perin, Note, Employers May Have to Pay When Domestic Violence Goes to
Work, 18 REV. LITIG. 365, 366 (1999).
72. Id. at 366-67.
73. Id. at 368.
74. Vaughn, supra note 13, at 231.
75. Sandra S. Park, Note, Working Towards Freedom From Abuse: Recognizing a "Public
Policy" Exception to Employment-at- Will for Domestic Violence Victims, 59 N.Y. U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 121, 122 (2003).
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employee did nothing "wrong,, 76 but the employer's fear that the bat-
terer may follow the employee into the workplace led to its decision to
terminate her before there was a possible violent episode at work. Some
abuse victims report that employers discriminate against them (includ-
ing termination) after finding out that they are an abuse victim.
7
1
"Domestic violence victims thus bear the burden of battering in their
work lives as well. ,
78
With an understanding in mind of what it means to be a victim of
domestic violence, and the effect domestic violence can have on a
woman's ability to remain successfully employed, an employer's decision
to terminate the employee-victim is likely met with significant skepti-
cism, at a minimum, if not unfettered outrage. However, as mentioned
above, there are not as many possible remedies available to a battered
woman who has been terminated as one may presume. The next part
will explore the possible liability an employer might face for terminating
an employee who is the victim of abuse as well as the possible liability an
employer might face if domestic violence spills over into the workplace
and violence ensues. Taken together, the conflicting liabilities reveal the
difficulty employers face making a decision when an employee-victim's
status threatens to endanger the workplace.
II. THE LAW
A. Possible Causes ofAction by Terminated Employee
1. Proposed and/or Enacted Statutory Responses
Many agree that it is difficult for a woman to bring a cause of ac-
tion if she is terminated because she is the victim of domestic violence.79
In apparent response to these lack of remedies, in July of 2001, both
houses of Congress introduced the Victims Economic Security and
Safety Act,8" which in addition to addressing leave and unemployment
benefits for abuse victims, also contained the Victims' Employment
76. I hesitate to use the word "wrong," as if to imply that taking time off work because of
domestic abuse is wrong, but missing work might violate an employer's specific pol-
icy, whereas simply the status of being a domestic violence victim does not.
77. Park, supra note 75, at 123.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Park, supra note 75, at 124.
80. H.R. 2670, 107th Congress, 1st Session (July 27, 2001).
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Sustainability Act (VESA)." This title of the bill represented the first
federal attempt to specifically tackle the problem of workplace discrimi-
nation against victims of domestic violence. The legislation proposed to
prohibit all forms of discrimination in the workplace against battered
women by requiring employers to accommodate victims of domestic
abuse and prohibiting an employer from terminating abuse victims even
if the victim's status threatens the workplace. This bill, despite some
public support from women's groups, 82 never made it out of the com-
mittee," and in October 2003, it was reintroduced as the Security and
Financial Empowerment Act.8
4
Most recently, the bill was reintroduced on June 30, 2005.85 This
2005 version is substantially similar to the 2003 version and the 2001
version except that it has omitted Title V from the 2003 version, the
Workplace Safety Program Tax Credit.16 Significant for this Article, Tide
II, the Victims' Employment Sustainability Act, has remained substan-
tially the same. It still prohibits discrimination by employers against
actual or perceived victims of domestic violence and includes a prohibi-
tion on taking an adverse employment action against an employee who
requests an accommodation or who disrupts or poses a threat to the
workplace. 7
In addition to this potential but unlikely federal remedy, there are a
couple of state and local governments that have enacted legislation that
would provide a possible remedy to victims of domestic violence who
are terminated by their employers. For instance, New York City
amended its discrimination laws to include a section on "Victims of
Domestic Violence.""8 This local code states that it is an "unlawful dis-
criminatory practice for an employer.., to refuse to hire or employ...
or to discharge... or to discriminate against an individual in compensa-
tion or other terms, conditions.., of employment because of the actual
or perceived status of said individual as a victim of domestic violence." 89
81. Id. at Tide lII.
82. See Statement of NOW President Patricia Ireland, Victims' Economic Security &
Safety Act: A Step In the Right Direction, July 25, 2001, http://www.now.org/press/
04-01/07-25.html.
83. Calaf, supra note 68, at 174.
84. Security and Financial Empowerment Act H.R 3420, 108th Congress, 1st Session
(Oct. 30, 2003).








Illinois became the first state to pass a law that not only provides
leave and accommodation rights for victims of domestic abuse, but also
prohibits discrimination against abuse victims. The Victims' Economic
Security and Safety Act (VESSA),9° which mirrors the federal law, was
signed into law by Governor Blagojevich on August 25, 2003. The stat-
ute's leave rights, which mirror rights provided under the Family
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), allow for up to a total of twelve weeks of
unpaid leave, without loss of benefits or seniority and with continuing
health insurance benefits in order to allow the employee-victim time to
deal with a variety of issues relating to the abuse or violence to which
she has been exposed. At the end of the leave, just as with qualifying
circumstances under the FMLA, the victim must be returned to her
same or an equivalent position."
Further, and particularly relevant to this Article, VESSA's Victims'
Employment Sustainability section addresses prohibited discriminatory
acts. This section first requires that employers provide reasonable ac-
commodations to employees who are victims of domestic abuse to assist
them in deflecting or minimizing the effects of the abuse or violence.
Some such enumerated accommodations include: changing telephone
numbers, changing the location of the employee-victim within or out-
side of an office or work area, making schedule changes, and installing
locks or implementing other safety or security procedures. 9" Under this
section, employers are prohibited from discriminating or retaliating
against an individual who is, or perceived to be, a victim of domestic
violence or who exercises her rights under the Act.94 Finally, employers
are prohibited from taking any action against an employee because the
workplace has been disrupted or threatened by the actions of a person
whom the employee states has committed or has threatened to commit
domestic violence against the employee or the employee's family or
household member." This statute differs from the federal bill in one im-
portant respect-it does not provide for a private cause of action by an
aggrieved employee. Instead, the employee-victim must make a
90. 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 180/1-45.
91. 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 180/20.
92. 820 Il. Comp. Stat. § 180/30(b)(1) (Supp. 2005) (defining "discriminate" as the
failure to make "a reasonable accommodation to the known limitations resulting
from circumstances relating to being a victim of domestic ... violence.").
93. Id.; see also NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG LLP EMPLOYMENT ALERT, NEW ILLINOIS
LAW ESTABLISHES LEAVE AND ACCOMMODATION RIGHTS FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC
AND SExuAL ABUSE (Sept. 2003).
94. 820 I11. Comp. Stat. § 180/1-45 (Supp. 2005).
95. 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 180/30 (a) (2) (Supp. 2005).
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complaint with the Department of Labor.9 6 Perhaps this distinction
would make a difference in the passage of the federal legislation.
No other state has passed comprehensive legislation to protect the
employment rights of victims, but some states have proposed legislation,
including Tennessee and Hawaii.97 In addition, some states protect vic-
tims who need to take a leave of absence for reasons related to domestic
violence98 and several states protect only public employees who are vic-
tims of domestic violence.99 Only time will tell if this trend in protecting
employee-victims will continue. However, assuming the victim in our
hypothetical does not live in one of the few localities with the above-
mentioned legislation, it is important to look at the other possible areas
of liability for an employer if it terminates the victim of domestic vio-
lence.
2. Sex Discrimination Under Title VII
When an employee-victim is terminated because she is a victim of
domestic violence (and the risk her status as such poses to the work-
place), many lay people would assume that such a termination would be
discriminatory.1° However, aside from the laws mentioned above, our
federal and state discrimination laws cover only certain categories-
namely, race, color, sex, religion, national origin, age and disability. As-
suming, as we did in this scenario, that this woman was white and under
the age of forty (and absent any religious, national origin or reverse dis-
crimination issues), the most obvious cause of action is a possible sex
discrimination claim.01 Battered women who are discriminated against
because of their status as a domestic violence victim may pursue a Title
VII claim using one or more of three available theories: disparate treat-
ment, disparate impact or sexual harassment.
10 2
96. 820 I1. Comp. Stat. § 180/35 (Supp. 2005).
97. See H.B. 385, 102d General Assemb. (Tenn. 2001) (substantially mirroring the pro-
posed federal legislation); S.B. 2438 & H.B. 2123, 21st Leg. (Haw. 2002).
98. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 230 (West 2003); 26 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 850
(Supp. 2005); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402.7 (2004).
99. Maryland Exec. Order No. 01.01.1998.25 (1998); New Hampshire Exec. Order No.
2000-10 (2000); Washington Exec. Order No. 96-05 (1996).
100. This assumption is based on my very unscientific survey, which included discussions
I have had regarding this hypothetical with twenty to thirty non-lawyers, all of whom
assumed that the termination would be illegal.
101. Disability issues will be discussed infra Part III.A.4.




Under a disparate treatment theory, the woman in our hypothetical
would have to prove that her sex motivated the employer's decision to
discharge her."' The cases that might arise under this theory entail one
of two possible factual circumstances: (1) situations where battered
women seek a benefit given to the men in the workplace; or (2) where
the same corporation employs both the abuser and the victim and treats
them differently once it learns about their abusive relationship.' 04 One
example of an employer's unequal treatment involved a case where a
woman was dating a co-worker. When she informed her company's per-
sonnel director that he had gone to her apartment and hit her during a
fight, she was told to stay home. When she returned to work, he as-
saulted her in the workplace, and the company terminated her, but did
not discipline him. This woman had a successful disparate treatment
claim.'05 No other courts have directly addressed this type of claim.06 In
our hypothetical, the terminated female would not be able to use this
theory because she was not treated differently than any man was. Pre-
sumably, our hypothetical employer would also terminate a man whose
103. Id.
104. Id. at 182; Rhode v. Steel Casting, Inc., 649 F.2d 317, 323 (5th Cir. 1981) (allowing
sex discrimination claim when the employer fired the female employee but not the
male employee, after he assaulted her).
105. Calaf, supra note 68, at 184-85.
106. There were a couple of cases that involved claims by victims of domestic violence,
albeit not employment cases. For instance, one case involved a woman who brought
an equal protection claim against the police and emergency response teams for giving
lower priority to domestic violence 911 calls than to non-domestic violence calls. The
court noted that most courts would only find a section 1983 claim when the plaintiff
could show sex discrimination (as opposed to discrimination against domestic vio-
lence victims). The court stated that the plaintiff could only establish an equal
protection claim if discriminatory intent against women can be inferred from the
practice. Fajardo v. County of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698, 699-700 (9th Cir. 1999);
see also Eggleston v. Suffolk County, 41 F.3d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1994) (where the
plaintiff alleged a violation of equal protection pursuant to section 1983, because the
police failed to protect her from domestic violence when her husband stabbed her
thirty times). In the Eggleston case, the court held that there could be no equal pro-
tection claim because the female plaintiff could not prove discriminatory intent by
the police. Even though discrimination against domestic violence victims would af-
fect more women than men, the court stated that showing a disparate impact is not
good enough under section 1983. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws
not equal results. Eggleston, 41 F.3d at 878. Accordingly, the court held that a di-
rected verdict is appropriate in a domestic violence equal protection claim unless the
plaintiff can provide evidence sufficient to sustain the inference that there is a policy
or a practice of affording less protection to victims of domestic violence than to other
victims of violence in comparable circumstances. Id.
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status as a victim of domestic violence created the likelihood of the
abuse coming into the workplace, as unlikely as that scenario might
seem.
b. Disparate Impact
A disparate impact claim differs from disparate treatment in that a
disparate impact claim does not require the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant-employer had the intent to discriminate against her, but
rather focuses on the results of a neutral policy or practice. 117 Using this
theory, the female in our hypothetical would need to establish that a
neutral policy operates to have a disproportionate effect on women over
men.'Os A disparate impact claim does not require a battered woman to
prove that her employer has a malicious intent. Instead, she can bring a
claim by establishing that a specific employment practice or policy
causes a statistically significant disparity between female and male em-
ployees and that the employment practice caused the disparity 09
For instance, a battered woman that is terminated would have to
prove that there is a facially neutral practice of terminating every em-
ployee that is a domestic violence victim and that this practice affects
more women than men in the workplace. 10 One author argued: "Given
the existing gender asymmetry of domestic violence, plaintiffs should be
able to easily demonstrate that any practice predicated on an employee's
condition as a victim of domestic abuse will disproportionately affect
women. ". In theory, then, the victim in our example should be able to
establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination using the disparate im-
pact theory because women are most often victims of domestic
violence." 2 In fact, more than ninety percent of victims of domestic
abuse are women."' Accordingly, one would assume that if the employer
107. Calaf, supra note 68, at 176; see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
(1971).
108. Calaf, supra note 68, at 176-77.
109. Id. at 185-86.
110. Id. at 187.
111. Id. (citations omitted).
112. See BERRY, supra note 24, at 67 (stating that women are most often the victims of
domestic violence).
113. Calaf, supra note 68, at 169; see also, Comment, Employer Liability for Domestic Vio-
lence in the Workplace: Are Employers Walking a Tightrope Without a Safety Net?, 31
TEx. TECH. L. Rav. 139, 167 (2000) [hereinafter Comment: Walking a Tightrope]
("[Blecause women are the large majority of victims of domestic violence in the
workplace, a discharge policy that retaliates against such victims will most likely cre-
ate a disproportionate adverse impact in violation of Title VII.").
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had a formal or informal policy of discharging employees who disrupt
the workplace because of their status as domestic violence victims, a dis-
charged employee-victim could argue that such a policy violates Title
VII because this neutral policy has a disproportionate impact on
114
women.
However, those who promote this as a successful theory would be
missing an important legal distinction. It is not enough to show that
theoretically, women would be terminated more often than men. In-
stead, a plaintiff would have to show that the policy of discharging
employees who are victims of domestic violence has actually affected a
disproportionate number of women in that employer's workplace." 5 If
only one woman has been terminated for this reason, she would be un-
able to advance this theory. Furthermore, employers may defend a
disparate impact claim with the business necessity defense, where the
employer can allege that the danger the violence may pose to other em-
ployees is justification for terminating the employee-victim.1 6 While in
theory this cause of action should be the most promising sex discrimina-
tion theory that an employee-victim might be able to use,'17 it would
nevertheless be unsuccessful in the case at hand, because there are insuf-
ficient statistics to prove the disparate impact.
c. Sexual Harassment
One other area of possible liability under Tide VII and state anti-
discrimination statutes is liability for sexual harassment. The sexual
114. Vaughn, supra note 13, at 240.
115. See Mark A. Player, Employment Discrimination Law 398 (West Publishing Co.
1988) (stating that "an employer's own experience with a rule resulting in discharge is
inadequate to reveal statistically significant patterns. Absent proof of adverse impact
[employer] will prevail."); see also Nicole Buonocore Porter, Marital Status Discrimi-
nation: A Proposalfrr Title VII Protection, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 9-12 (2000) (arguing
that it is difficult to show the requisite statistical proof); Dibiase v. Smith Kline
Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732 (3d Cir. 1995) (refusing to find disparate impact
liability because there was no evidence that "the company's policy does in fact affect
[the protected class] adversely"); Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d 1506, 1509-
10 (10th Cit. 1987)(holding that a no-spouse rule that affected only two women is
not a statistically significant sample on which to base a disparate impact claim); Soria
V. Ozinga Bros., Inc., 704 F.2d 990, 995 (7th Cir 1995) (holding too small of sample
size).
116. See HAROLD S. LEwiS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW AND PRACTICE 251 (West 2d ed. 2004).
117. It is, for instance, more promising than a disparate treatment theory where the plain-
tiff would have to show that the employer intentionally discriminated against her
because ofher sex.
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harassment doctrine may result in employer liability in situations where
an employee-victim is harassed by a current or former intimate part-
ner.' In general, an employer has an obligation under sexual
harassment laws to remedy the harassment or abuse if an employee is
harassed by another employee or supervisor. However, employers may
also be liable even if the harasser is not an employee, but rather is a visi-
tor or a vendor." 9
There are two main theories of liability under our sexual harass-
ment laws: quid pro quo harassment and hostile environment claims. In
order to state a claim under a quid pro quo theory, the barterer must be
in a position of authority over the victim (in the employment context-
not personally). Accordingly, "[o]nly women who work directly under
the supervision of their intimate partners or in a department managed
by their abusers will have the option of invoking this theory."'120 Because
most employers have policies prohibiting dating or married employees
from supervising one another,12' it is unlikely that an abuse victim
would be in this situation.
The hostile work environment theory is the other method of estab-
lishing sexual harassment liability. This theory exists when an
individual's conduct "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfer-
ing with an [employee's] work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment.' ' 22 Even if an abused woman
proves that her abuser/co-worker created a hostile work environment for
her, she must also prove that the employer knew or should have known
about the harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial actions.
2 3
"Thus, only women who disclose the abusive nature of their intimate
relationships to their employers or women who exhibit the physical
signs of abuse can successfully sue under this theory."
24
118. Vaughn, supra note 13, at 239-40.
119. Robertson, supra note 9, at 652. For instance, to repeat an often-used example of
mine, if a delivery driver continually makes inappropriately suggestive comments to
the receptionist when he is delivering packages, she can complain to her employer
and the employer has an obligation to ensure that the harassing behavior stops, even
though the harasser is not its own employee. See Dunn v. Washington County
Hosp., 429 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2005) (arguing that an employer could be liable if an
independent contractor, a customer, or even a macaw engages in harassing behavior
directed at one sex over the other sex).
120. Calaf, supra note 68, at 177 (citations omitted).
121. See Porter, supra note 115, at 46-47 (arguing that employers should have rules pro-
hibiting dating or married employees from being in a supervisory relationship with
one another).





This theory can also potentially be used even if the abuser does not
work with his victim, but he harasses her during the workday. In this
situation, an employer has an obligation to take reasonable steps to rem-
edy the harassment if the employee complains about the harassment or
the employer learns of the harassment through other means.125 However,
there are possible defenses an employer could have against a plaintiff
suing under this theory. For instance, an employer could defend such a
claim by arguing that the abuse (which is the harassing behavior) is not
because of her "sex," but rather, because of circumstances particular to
their relationship.126 Furthermore, courts frequently look at the "social
context when analyzing hostile work environment claims." 27 In cases of
domestic violence, the "social context" refers to the relationship between
the parties. This relationship may undermine the victim's hostile envi-
ronment claim, especially if the court views the harassment as personal
rather than harassment based on the victim's gender.2 1 "The new
emphasis on social context is likely to significantly restrict [the em-
ployee-victim's] likelihood of prevailing on a sexual harassment claim."
29
Because a terminated employee-victim would not likely succeed with a
sex discrimination claim, other causes of action need to be explored.
3. Wrongful Discharge
Most people who hear of an employer's decision to terminate a
domestic violence victim express outrage at such a decision, and firmly
believe that a woman should have a claim against the employer in this
scenario.13 However, the general rule is that, unless stated otherwise in
an employment contract, all employees are at-will employees, which
means they can be terminated "for good cause, for no cause or even for
bad cause. '""' Accordingly, in order for a discharged employee to file a
125. Id. at 178-79.
126. Id. at 179.
127. Id. at 179-80.
128. Id. at 180.
129. Id. at 181.
130. It is this author's experience that most people unfamiliar with employment law think
that every "unfair" termination is actionable. This, of course, is untrue, as will be
demonstrated below.
131. Jesse Rudy, What They Don't Know Won't Hurt Them: Defending Employment-At-Will
In Light of Findings That Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection, 23 J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 307, 308 (2002) (citations omitted); STEVEN L. WILBORN, STEWART
J. SCHWAB AND JOHN F. BURTON, JR., EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 95
(2002).
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wrongful termination claim, she must be able to point to a specific
statutory or common law cause of action.
a. Violation of Public Policy
One exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is a public pol-
icy claim, which most states now recognize.132 This cause of action varies
widely by states. However, some generalizations can be made. For in-
stance, an employee could bring claim for a violation of public policy if
she was terminated for following the law.' Some believe that employees
who are fired because of their status as a victim of abuse should be able
to bring such a claim, because the dismissal contravenes the state's inter-
est in supporting the rights of domestic violence victims and combating
abuse. 134 "[F]iring employees because they are battered or pursue legal
assistance for domestic violence constitutes wrongful discharge in viola-
tion of public policy, such as policies protecting domestic violence
victims, prohibiting assault and battery, ensuring access to the courts,
and barring sex discrimination."'35 As will be seen below, this is not a
universally shared belief regarding the status of the law.
While the law varies widely, the elements generally required to es-
tablish a cause of action for violation of public policy are: "1) the
existence of a clear public policy; 2) dismissal of employees under cir-
cumstances [that] ... would jeopardize the public policy; 3) [the] ...
dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public policy; and 4)
the employer lacked overriding legitimate business justification for the
,,131dismissal. Proving the existence of a clear public policy is the most
difficult element for plaintiffs.
37
Certain categories of termination have been recognized under the
public policy theory: "1) discharges for refusing to violate [the law]; 2)
discharges for satisfying legal or civil obligations; 3) discharges for exer-
cising statutory or constitutional rights or privileges; and 4) discharges
for 'reasons deemed repugnant to public policy.", 3 Of course, not all
states recognize all four categories and certainly some of these categories
will be more helpful to victims of domestic violence than others. For
instance, if an abuse victim is required to testify in court against her
132. Vaughn, supra note 13, at 241.
133. Id.
134. Park, supra note 75, at 124.
135. Id. at 129.
136. Id. at 133; see also WILBORN ET. AL., supra note 131, at 150.
137. Park, supra note 75, at 133.
138. Id. at 134 (citations omitted).
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abuser, and was fired for doing so, she might be able to bring a cause of
action against her employer under the second category-"discharges for
satisfying legal or civil obligations." '39 This, however, was not the sce-
nario in our hypothetical. In fact, the woman in the hypothetical refused
to testify against her abuser.
Certainly, many would agree that discharging a woman who is a
victim of domestic violence is "repugnant to public policy."
Given the state's strong interest in combating domestic vio-
lence, firing employees because of their status as abuse victims
is certainly repugnant to public policy. For this last category of
dismissal, the sources of public policy referred to by the courts
become especially important because they define the scope of
what qualifies as repugnant to public policy.
4°
Especially under this category, it is important to find a recognizable
public policy. 4'
One author claimed that domestic violence victims who have been
discharged because they exercise statutory and constitutional rights, such
as "the right to work free from sex discrimination and the right to work-
place safety," should be able to claim a violation of public policy cause of
action. 4 2 However, based on the dearth of case law in this area, it is
unlikely courts would recognize causes of action for wrongful discharge
when an employer fires a domestic violence victim.
Most courts presented with these types of claims focus on whether
the employee's claim protects the interests of the community. "[T]he
policy in question must involve a matter that affects society at large
rather than a purely personal or proprietary interest of the plaintiff or
employer." 43 If the court characterizes the dispute as a private one, it
will refuse to accept a public policy claim. Accordingly, how courts
consider the public-private dichotomy becomes very important for the
domestic violence victim. Many courts might consider domestic
139. Id. at 135.
140. Id. at 136-37.
141. While invasion of privacy is a separate cause of action that will be discussed later, see
infra Part II.A.6, some courts have stated that the common law claim of invasion of
privacy might provide the public policy necessary for the wrongful termination claim.
See, e.g., Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir. 1992).
142. Park, supra note 75, at 136.
143. Park supra note 75, at 138 (quoting Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 684 (Cal.
1992); see also Imes v. City of Asheville, 594 S.E.2d 397, 399 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)
(stating that the complaint fails to allege any harm to the public).
144. Park, supra note 75, at 138.
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violence to be a private interest rather than a public one, because for
years society refused to recognize it as a crime, and instead treated it as
something to hide behind closed doors.'
To date, only a few cases have led to published opinions regarding
the wrongful discharge of a domestic violence victim. In Green v. Bry-
ant,146 the judge rejected the plaintiff's claim that the employer
terminated her in violation of public policy. The plaintiff alleged that
after her employer discovered that her estranged husband had raped and
beaten her, the employer fired her based solely on the fact that she was a
victim of domestic violence. 147 The court rejected the claim, stating that
the two public policies asserted by the plaintiff did not protect her from
discharge. First, it ruled that the public policy she asserted in favor of
privacy did not offer her any relief since she made no allegation that the
defendant initiated the conversation or required disclosure of private
information. 14 Second, it held that the victim's rights statutes she relied
on to establish her public policy claim might allow her to recover eco-
nomic losses from her husband or the Crime Victim's Compensation
Board, but do "not create employment rights or privileges." Accordingly,
the court held that the dismissal of the plaintiff did not violate any pub-
lic policy.149 The court did note that some plaintiffs could bring a claim
on similar facts if they had "exercised a right or privilege granted by the
,,.)150law." 5
A recently published opinion dealt with the very unusual situation
of a man who was terminated, apparently because of his status as a do-
mestic violence victim.'5 ' The court held that, while domestic violence is
a serious social problem for the state, it is not a protected classification
(as is race, sex, etc.); therefore, the plaintiff failed to identify any public
policy that was violated when defendant fired plaintiff for being a victim
of domestic violence. 1
52
Another case held that it was a violation of public policy to termi-
nate the victim for absenteeism caused by domestic violence.' In this
145. See id. at 140-41 (noting that "[f]eminist scholars have argued that the failure to
address domestic violence in the public sphere contributes to re-victimization perpe-
trated by society as a whole."); see also BERRY, supra note 24, at 155.
146. Green v. Bryant, 887 F.Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
147. Id. at 800.
148. Id. at 801. This could be a possible cause of action for the woman in our scenario
because the employer did initiate the conversation with her. But see supra Part II.A.5.
149. Green, 887 F.Supp. at 801.
150. Id.
151. Imes, 594 S.E.2d at 397.
152. Id. at 399-400.
153. Apessos v. Memorial Press Group, 15 Mass. L. Rep. 322, 324 (Super. Ct. 2002).
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case, the plaintiff suffered physical abuse from her husband. She missed
her next scheduled workday to apply for a temporary abuse prevention
order, appear at her husband's arraignment, have the police take photo-
graphs of her beaten face, and have the locks changed on her home.
54
115The next day, the employer terminated her for absenteeism. The court
stated that in order to prove a violation of public policy under Massa-
chusetts law, she must prove: "(1) that the employer discharged her, (2)
for reason in violation of public policy, (3) embodied in a specific provi-
sion of law such as a constitutional clause or statute.,5 6 The court found
that because she was engaged in an activity authorized by law (cooperat-
ing with law enforcement activities), her claim survived. 157 "The public
policy interests here are primal, not complex: the protection of a victim
from physical and emotional violence; and the protection of a victim's
livelihood.... A victim should not have to seek physical safety at the
cost of her employment."'58 Certainly, if an employee-victim was fired
for engaging in activities authorized or required by law to combat the
physical violence, she might have a claim. However, that fact scenario
was not raised in the hypothetical at issue.
Finally, some believe that a plaintiff might be able to use the stat-
utes prohibiting sex discrimination as the public policy to support the
wrongful discharge claim.' One commentator stated that the public
policy law should and would "begin to recognize that termination of
employment due to complications associated with domestic violence
violates public policy because it discriminates against women."' 60 How-
ever, there are no cases that would directly support the use of this theory.
While there are many possible theories of liability under this cause of
action, it remains unclear how successful this cause of action would be
in most circumstances similar to our hypothetical. The widely varied
nature of state law will have an effect on the plaintiff's ability to bring
such a cause of action.
b. Breach of Contract
State law varies widely in this area as well, but occasionally an em-
ployer's handbook or other employment policies can create a contractual
154. Id. at 323.
155. Id
156. Id.
157. Id. at 324.
158. Id.
159. Park, supra note 75, at 155-57.
160. Comment: Walking a Tightrope, supra note 113, at 168.
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right that may lead to a breach of contract action if the employer does
not follow its own policies.' For instance, "[i]f employers outline their
workplace violence policies in employee handbooks but do not follow
them, they may be held liable.., based on breach of contract."•62 If the
employee handbook provides a "domestic violence policy or provides for
time off work to receive medical or legal assistance, then an employee
could bring a breach of contract claim against the employer if she is
dismissed for needing to take leave as a result of domestic violence.", 63 In
the hypothetical at hand, there was a workplace violence policy, but the
employer's actions did not violate it, so the plaintiff in our hypothetical
would be unable to allege this cause of action.
4. Claims under Union Collective Bargaining Agreements
If an employer is unionized, it most likely has a collective bargain-
ing agreement with the union that governs the employer-employee
relationship. If so, employees most likely have a right under the collec-
tive bargaining agreement to grieve their discharges.J Grievances are
usually brought before an arbitrator to decide whether there was "just• 165fo
cause" for the termination. In order for an employer to be able to sup-
port a termination for employee misconduct that occurs off of the
employer's premises, the employer must prove that the:
1. behavior harms [the] [c]ompany's reputation or prod-
uct... ;
2. behavior renders [the] employee unable to perform his
duties or appear at work, in which case the discharge
would be based on inefficiency or excessive absentee-
ism ... ; [or]
161. See Hayes, Outten & Steer, supra note 11, at 312 (noting possible breach of contract
claim based on policy manual); Vaughn, supra note 13, at 241-42 (describing possi-
ble cause of action if contractual obligations arose from oral or written promises that
employers make about safety at the workplace).
162. Robertson, supra note 9, at 651.
163. Park, supra note 75, at 128.
164. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 198-200 (Alan
Miles Ruben, ed., BNA Books 2003) (1952); see also Runge & Hearn, supra note 1,
at 823 (stating that a domestic violence victim who is a union member should con-
tact her union representative to help her negotiate with the employer or file a union
grievance on her behalf if she is treated unfairly).
165. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 164, at 931-33.
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3. behavior leads to refusal, reluctance or inability of other
employees to work with him.' 6
Using this standard in Montgomery County Children Services, 161 the Arbi-
trator held that the employer did not have just cause to terminate a
female victim of domestic violence. 168 Among other reasons, the Arbitra-
tor stated that the woman's status as a domestic violence victim would
not impair her ability to perform her job working with families of abuse
victims. 161 While this case did not deal with the termination of a domes-
tic violence victim because of the potential risk to the workplace,'7 ° it
does provide an example of an arbitrator's sympathy toward a domestic
violence victim.
It is this author's belief that an arbitrator would not find just cause
for the termination of a domestic violence victim in part because arbi-
trators do not usually consider an employer's interest in avoiding
liability. One example of this phenomenon is in the area of sexual har-
assment grievances. As stated earlier, the law dictates that employers
have sexual harassment policies prohibiting sexual harassment.' 7' When
an employer learns of sexual harassment, it is required to take swift, re-
medial action designed at stopping the offensive behavior.' If an
employee engages in egregious harassment and the employer takes no
action or insufficient action, the harassed employee is able to bring a
lawsuit for sexual harassment. 73 However, if the employer takes an ac-
tion that the alleged harasser feels is too severe for his offense, and the
employee belongs to a union, the union will likely bring a grievance and
try to get the discipline or termination overturned.'
74
In an article exploring arbitrators' treatment of grievances brought
by employees terminated or disciplined for sexual harassment, the au-
thors found that, out of 107 cases studied, arbitrators reduced the
discipline in forty of the cases and overturned the discipline completely
166. Id. at 939 (footnote omitted).
167. 113 LA (BNA) 463, 472 (1999) (Imundo, Arb.).
168. Id. at 474 .
169. See id. at 472.
170. None do. For examples of cases where domestic violence is an issue at all, see South-
western Bell Telephone Co., 95 LA 46 (1990) (Massey, Arb.) (upholding termination
for falsifying insurance records despite claim of battered woman syndrome as a de-
fense); City of Largo, Florida, 1997 WL 1068749 (Abrams, Arb.) (reinstating
perpetrator of domestic violence).
171. See supra Part II.A.2.C.
172. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
173. Id.
174. Carrie G. Donald & John D. Ralston, Arbitral Views of Sexual Harassment: An Analy-
sis ofArbitration Cases, 1990-2000, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMp. L. J. 229, 230 (2003).
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in eleven of the cases.' It is easy to see how this statistic leads employers
into a "catch-22." Or, to put it more brusquely, unionized employers are
"damned if they do and damned if they don't." Unionized employers are
stuck with the decision to risk the sexual harassment case or to live with
the knowledge that the discipline they impose will likely be reduced or-• 176
reversed in a subsequent arbitration.
This type of "catch-22" is also present in cases where domestic vio-
lence victims are terminated.'7 If the employer fires the victim to avoid
the risk of exposing the workplace to violence perpetrated by the victim's
abuser, and the employee files a grievance, the employer might have the
termination overturned in a subsequent arbitration. However, some em-
ployers feel that if it does not terminate the victim, that it will suffer a
much more serious lawsuit (by the injured parties) if violence ensues.178
5. Claims under the ADA
a. General Law
In addition to the sex discrimination claims discussed earlier, it is
important to look at another statutory claim, a disability discrimination
claim. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimina-
tion against a "qualified individual with a disability." 79 The law under
the ADA is important because if an abuse victim is disabled due to the
domestic violence, an employer might be liable under the ADA for ter-
minating her.80 In order to have a disability claim under the ADA, the
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, which includes the following
elements: (1) that the plaintiff was disabled within the meaning of the
Act; (2) that the plaintiff was qualified for the position with or without
175. Id. at 301.
176. See Beaver, supra note 4, at 122 (discussing a case where the court upheld an arbitra-
tor's reinstatement where an employee was fired for fighting).
177. In all fairness, these situations are not exactly analogous because a domestic violence
victim is not comparable to a sexual harassment perpetrator. However, in both situa-
tions, employers must decide between two very difficult decisions.
178. Beaver, supra note 4, at 123 ("Since the court system offers an employer little re-
course against former employees who engage in violent behavior, an employer must
choose between the lesser of two evils when assessing preventative strategies to curb
workplace violence.").
179. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Rohan v. Networks Presentation LLC, 175 F. Supp. 2d 806,
811 (D. Md. 2001). State anti-discrimination statutes also proscribe discrimination
against the disabled. Because those statutes usually mirror the federal statute (the
ADA), this discussion will focus on the ADA.
180. Comment: Walking a Tightrope, supra note 113, at 165.
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reasonable accommodations; and (3) that the plaintiff suffered an ad-
verse employment action because of her disability."' In order to prove
that she was disabled, the plaintiff must have a physical or mental im-
pairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, a
record of such an impairment, or must be regarded as having such an
impairment."2 A plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability if she
can, with or without reasonable accommodations, perform the essential
functions of the position. 83 The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) defines impairment to include any mental or psy-
chological disorder, such as an emotional or mental illness. 4 Finally, in
order to find a substantial limitation on a major life activity, it is neces-
sary to know what constitutes a "major life activity." Activities such as
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, sleeping, eating,
caring for oneself, and interacting with others, are all major life activi-
ties, as well as possibly others. 5
b. Is She Disabled?
Under the analysis above, the first inquiry is whether a plaintiff
who is the victim of domestic abuse has a disability. Some employee-
victims may experience permanent mental and/or physical disabilities
including depression,1 86 post-traumatic stress disorder, back pain, and
loss of hearing or sight due to repeated blows to the head, neck and
face. i8 7 Leaving aside the physical disabilities, for which there is no evi-
dence in our hypothetical, and are less likely to occur than the mental
impairments a victim of domestic violence may suffer, it is necessary to
analyze whether the employee-victim has a mental disability.
188
181. Willis v. Pacific Maritime Assoc., 162 F.3d 561, 565 (9th Cir. 1998).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (2001); Rohan, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 811.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2001).
184. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2004).
185. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2004); Rohan, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 812.
186. Eric Matu Sewitch, Workplace Rights of Domestic Violence Victims, 2 Workplace Law
Report (BNA), No. 13 p. 473 (March 26, 2004) (mentioning depression as a possible
disability of battered women).
187. Comment: Walking a Tightrope, supra note 113, at 166; see also BERRY, supra note 24,
at 93 (noting that physical injuries may cause lifelong disabling effects, such as con-
tinuous pain and chronic discomfort that interfere with a woman's ability to work
and that head injuries in particular can cause many problems-physical, cognitive,
behavioral and emotional).
188. This is not to say that battered women do not suffer physical injury--obviously they
do-but those injuries are not often severe enough to cause a permanent injury that
would be necessary to prove that the abuse victim has a physical disability.
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As described supra Part I.A, the most likely mental disability a do-
mestic abuse victim may have is post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
or battered women's syndrome, which is a subset of PTSD. 9 "Symp-
toms of post-traumatic stress disorder, common in domestic abuse
victims, include lack of concentration, avoiding challenges, lack of crea-
tivity, distrust of others, anxiety and difficulty sleeping."1 90 While
domestic violence experts believe that this disorder is not a form of men-
tal illness,' 9' that assertion was not made in the context of the ADA.
Under the ADA, courts usually undertake a case-by-case analysis rather
than deciding whether something is or is not a disability simply by cate-
gorizing an impairment.1 92 If the symptoms suffered by the victim result
in substantial limitations on major life activities, it is likely that a court
would find that PTSD is a disability.'"
There are several examples where courts considered whether PTSD
was a disability, albeit not necessarily in the domestic violence context.
For instance, in one case, the court noted that "numerous courts have
held that [post-traumatic stress disorder] can constitute a disability
within the meaning of the ADA if it substantially limits a major life ac-
tivity." 194 Both caring for oneself and sleeping (two things likely to
become difficult for battered women) are major life activities."'
In an unpublished case where the plaintiff was diagnosed with
PTSD and suffered from severe depression and anxiety, the court held
that the plaintiff was disabled under the ADA because the disorder sub-
stantially "limited a variety of his major life activities, including, but not
necessarily limited to, his ability to eat properly, sleep properly, engage
in intimate sexual relations, participate in hobbies, maintain mental
189. BERRY, supra note 24, at 55-60.
190. Robertson, supra note 9, at 638.
191. BERRY, supra note 24, at 56-57.
192. For instance, the Supreme Court has said that monocular vision is not always a dis-
ability under the ADA and lower courts are required to decide these issues on a case-
by-case basis. See Albertsons, Inc. v. Hallie Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999).
193. See BERRY, supra note 24, at 57 (stating that while PTSD is not a form of craziness,
"it can render a person incapable of accessing her inner resources to make a
change.... The control tactics can virtually destroy her ability to think clearly."); see
also THE WoRKPLAcE RESPONDS, supra note 19, at 128.
194. Rohan v. Networks Presentation LLC, 175 F. Supp. 2d 806, 812 n.9 (D. Md. 2001)
(citing Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir.
1998); Zale v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 2000 WL 306943, at *3 (D. Conn. 2000),
Hetreed v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1999 WL 311728, at *10 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Sherback v.
Wright Auto. Group, 987 F.Supp. 433, 436 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Coaker v. Home
Nursing Servs., Inc., WL 316739, at *12 (S.D. Ala. 1996)).
195. Rohan, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 812-13.
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concentration, have proper memory retention, and participate and func-
tion in personal relationships. '96
In our proposed hypothetical, this is one issue that is difficult to
analyze because all of the details are not known to make such a fact-
sensitive determination. If we assume that the hypothetical woman was
not disabled, this inquiry would end there. 97 However, if we assume she
is, or that other similar women might be, it is necessary to first deter-
mine whether she was terminated because of her disability. The ADA
has both an anti-discrimination component and a reasonable accommo-
dation component. In order to prove a discrimination claim under the
ADA, a plaintiff would have to show that she was terminated because of
her disability. An employer could make the argument that she was not
terminated because of her disability, but because of the fact that she is a
victim of domestic violence, which makes her a threat to the workplace.
Remember that her status as an abuse victim does not make her dis-
abled; rather, she is potentially disabled (in this example) because she
suffers from PTSD. Some scholars are troubled by this analysis because
it circumvents the employer's obligation to make a reasonable accom-
modation to a disabled employee, but this is the analysis that most
courts would follow.
19 8
196. Berry, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 6278, at *16-17; see also Fields v. St. Bernard Parish
School Board, 2000 WL 1560012, at *4 (E.D. La. 2000) (noting that the Fifth Cir-
cuit has said that PTSD, while not a per se disability, may constitute a disability
when the plaintiff can also show that the disorder impaired one of her major life ac-
tivities); Hoffman v. City of Inglewood, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 11790, at *1-2 (6th
Cir., May 16, 1997); Laden & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 266.
197. A victim of domestic abuse might also have a cause of action if her employer regarded
her as disabled under the ADA, even if she was not actually disabled. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(1) (2004) (defining "regarded as disabled" as someone who has an impair-
ment that does not substantially limit major life activities but an employer treats as
having such a limitation or someone not having any impairment but the employer
treats as having an impairment). Keep in mind, however, that such a cause of action
does not usually require the employer to offer reasonable accommodations; it only
prohibits the employer from discriminating against her because it regards her as dis-
abled. See Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cit. 1999); Kaplan v. City
of North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1233 (9th Cir. 2003); Barnes v. Northwest Iowa
Health Center, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1090 (N.D. Iowa 2002). But see Jacques v.
DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 166 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Williams v. Philadel-
phia Housing Authority Police Dept., 380 F.3d 751, 773 (3d Cir. 2004). For an
interesting discussion of this circuit split, see Timothy J. McFarlin, If They Ask for a
Stool... Recognizing Reasonable Accommodation for Employees "Regarded As" Disabled,
49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 927 (2005). Regardless of the eventual resolution of this circuit
split, there is no evidence that the employer in the hypothetical here regarded the
employee-victim as disabled.
198. Laden & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 267-68.
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c. Reasonable Accommodation
As stated above, if an employee is disabled, the law requires an em-
ployer to provide reasonable accommodations to her so that she can
perform her job. 9 However, the difficulty in this analysis is figuring out
what is a reasonable accommodation for her disability. Her status as a
victim of domestic violence does not make her disabled. Rather, using
the example of PTSD, it is the disorder that might require accommoda-
tion. For instance, if she requested unpaid time off work to seek therapy
for her PTSD, it might be reasonable for the employer to provide her
with that accommodation. 00 However, if she requested some type of
extra protection or job modification to protect her from her abusive
partner, is that reasonable? The argument will be made that such an ac-
commodation would be accommodating her status as a domestic abuse
victim, not her disability of PTSD'O°
d. Direct Threat Defense
One exception to the employer's obligation to provide a reasonable
accommodation to a disabled employee is the direct threat defense. Spe-
cifically, the ADA states a person is not qualified for the position if that
202person poses a direct threat to the health and safety of others. Direct
threat, in turn, is defined as a "significant risk to the health or safety of
others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." 203 In
making the direct threat analysis, the ADA calls for rational, scientific
204decision making. If an employer wants to exclude someone based
on safety concerns, it is necessary for the employer to prove that the in-
199. Comment: Walking a Tightrope, supra note 113, at 165.
200. See, e.g., Dockery v. North Shore Medical Center, 909 F. Supp. 1550, 1555-56
(S.D.FI. 1995). Note that while unpaid leave is frequently an accommodation given,
courts do not usually allow unlimited or indefinite leave. See Kalskett v. Larson
Manuf. Co. of Iowa, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 961, 981 (N.D. Iowa 2001); Monette v.
Electronic Data Systems Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1187 (6th Cir. 1996); see also THE
WORKPLACE REsPONDS, supra note 19, at 128.
201. Some of the proposed legislation discussed supra actually does require that an em-
ployer make such accommodations for a victim of domestic violence. Supra Part
II.A.1. Furthermore, not everyone would make such a distinction when deciding
whether the accommodation is reasonable. See THE WORKPLACE RESPONDS, supra
note 19, at 128.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (2000).
204. Laden & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 264.
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dividual poses a direct threat to others. 25 The EEOC has said that in
order to make out a direct threat defense, the employer must make a
reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical
knowledge and the best objective evidence, considering the following
specific factors: (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the likelihood that the
potential harm will occur; (3) the nature and severity of the potential
harm; and (4) the imminence of the potential harm. °6
Accordingly, in the hypothetical at hand, if we were to assume that
the terminated victim of domestic abuse was in fact disabled, the em-
ployer would have to prove that her disability created a substantial and
significant risk of harm to the workplace. As discussed earlier, the poten-
tial disability is PTSD, so the employer would have to prove that the
fact that she has PTSD has caused or will cause a significant threat to
the workplace. Even if the issue was whether her association with her
abuser (which is not in fact the disability) caused a direct threat, the an-
swer would still likely be no. In other words, if the employer has
nothing but speculation that her abusive husband might come into the
workplace to harm her, it is unlikely that the employer would be able to
meet the very high direct threat burden.
e. Disability by Association Claim
The ADA not only prohibits discrimination against disabled per-
sons, but it also prohibits discrimination against an individual who is
known to have a relationship or association with an individual who is
known to have a disability.207 Accordingly, even if the employee-victim is
not disabled under the ADA, it is possible that she could bring a cause
of action stating that the employer discriminated against her not because
of her own disability but because she is associated with the batterer who
205. Id.
206. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r), Hayes, Outten & Steer, supra note 11, at 305 ("The threat
has to be a significant-not a hypothetical or mere potential-risk. The risk has to be
actual and imminent, not prospective or long-term. The risk must have an objective
basis and cannot be conjecture."); see also Beaver, supra note 4, at 116 (noting how
narrow the exception is in some cases); Anger and the ADA-Are Workers With Vio-
lent Tendencies Protected? EMP. & LAB. L. (Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart, P.C., Chi., Ill.), June/July 2003, at 5 (citing Koshko v. Gen. Elec. Co., No.
01-C-5069, (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2003) (holding that an employee who made threats
to kill a co-worker is a direct threat)).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2004) ("The term 'discriminate' includes: ... (4) exclud-
ing or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of
the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to
have a relationship or association.").
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may have a disability."' Courts have been willing to recognize a cause of
action for discrimination against an employee because that employee is
associated with a disabled person. 29 This leads to the question: Does the
abuser have a disability? It may be likely that the batterer does have a
disability if he has a personality disorder, or suffers from depression,
which can also be considered a disability. One study found that there is
a high correlation with batterers and head injuries, which may also be a
disability.210 If the employer was aware that the employee-victim's bat-
terer had a disability, and the employer fired the employee-victim
because of the disability, the employee should have a claim under this
theory. However, even if the abuser in this Article's hypothetical had a
disability, the employer was unaware of any disability, and therefore, the
employee-victim's claim would fail.
6. Invasion of Privacy Claim
In addition to the traditional employment claims the employee-
victim might have, there are a couple of tort claims that warrant a brief
discussion. Some have argued that victims of domestic abuse may have a
cause of action for invasion of privacy if the employer pries into her per-
sonal life to interrogate her about the domestic violence she suffered .
"The privacy instinct, in particular, is so deeply embedded in the
American psyche that intrusions on that privacy, even by private parties,
is cause for consternation and sometimes litigation., 21 2 The common-
law "intrusion upon seclusion" cause of action most directly applies to
208. Hayes, Outten & Steer, supra note 11, at 312.
209. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4); Barker v. Int'l Paper Co., 993 F. Supp. 10, 14-15 (D.
Maine 1998) (recognizing the disability cause of action, but ultimately finding that
plaintiff had not met his burden of proving a causal connection between his associa-
tion with his disabled wife and his termination); Saladin v. Turner, 936 F. Supp.
1571, 1580-81 (N.D. Okla. 1996) (finding that plaintiff had made out a prima facie
case of disability by association).
210. BERRY, supra note 24, at 42.
211. See Beaver, supra note 4, at 120 (claiming that there are privacy issues with em-
ployer's zero tolerance workplace violence policies); see also Vaughn, supra note 13, at
245; Zollers & Callahan, supra note 8, at 461 ("Corporate responses ... are likely to
run contrary to traditional democratic values because they have the potential of in-
truding on employees' privacy and dignity."). But see THE WORKPLACE RESPONDS,
supra note 19, at 81 (suggesting that employers include the employee-victim in their
discussions and question her about her abuser and their relationship).
212. Zollers & Callahan, supra note 8, at 470; see also Zollers & Callahan, supra note 8, at
472 (stating that profiling to predict potentially violent employees carries enormous




this type of situation. To claim intrusion upon seclusion, the employee
would generally have to prove that: "1) the intrusion or prying into
[her] seclusion [was] unauthorized; 2) the intrusion [was] offensive or
objectionable to a reasonable [person]; 3) the matter upon which the
intrusion [occurred] [was] private; and (4) the intrusion [caused her]
anguish and suffering., 213 However, because some workplace violence
policies (including the one in our hypothetical) require an employee to
sign the policy, authorizing interviews and searches, the employee-victim
would not be able to meet the first element-that the intrusion was un-
authorized.214 Furthermore, although this claim may allow a plaintiff to
collect monetary damages, generally, it could not be used as a wrongful
discharge claim. In other words, a plaintiff could not normally seek rein-
statement under this theory.215
7. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Some might be outraged at an employer's decision to terminate the
employee-victim, but in order to bring a claim of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, the employee must prove that: (1) the conduct is
"intentional or reckless"; (2) the conduct is "extreme or outrageous"; (3)
there is a "causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the
emotional distress"; and (4) "the emotional distress must be severe.,
2 16
Element two-that the conduct is extreme or outrageous-is a very dif-
ficult one to meet, requiring that the conduct is "so outrageous in
character, so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community."21 7 While there is no case law regarding a cause of
action by a terminated employee-victim using this theory, I find it
unlikely that a court would find the type of outrageous and extreme be-
havior required under this tort, in part because the employer's actions
were designed to avoid violence in the workplace." 8
213. STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS, 874-75 (Clark Board-
man Callaghan 1991).
214. See e.g., Jennings v. Minco Tech. Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989) (stating that employers are shielded from liability if the employee consents to
the intrusion, e.g., drug testing).
215. See Frank J. Cavico, Invasion of Privacy in the Private Employment Sector: Tortious and
EthicalAspects, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1263, 1280-81.
216. SPEISER ET AL., supra, note 213, at 1028-31.
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
218. See Welsh v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 713 N.E.2d 679, 684 (Ill. App. Ct.
1999) (stating that "if the anxiety and stress resulting from discipline ... or even
20061
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER d LAW
As one can see from above, while there are many possible causes of
action a terminated victim of domestic violence could bring, there is not
one cause of action that emerges as a certain success for the employee-
victim. Depending on the state in which the employer operates, the
most probable cause of action is the violation of public policy claim.1 9
However, in order to have this claim, the female victim must be able tot / t220
point to some public policy that her actions furthered. She was not
discharged for refusing to violate any law, or for exercising her rights
under any law. She was also not discharged for testifying in court or us-
ing the legal system to assist her with her status as a domestic violence
victim. 221 One possible theory is that she was discharged for reasons
deemed repugnant to public policy. However, due to the lack of case law
to support this theory of liability,222 it is unlikely that her claim would
survive. Furthermore, she would also have to show that the employer
lacked a legitimate business justification for her termination. It is possi-
ble that the threat of liability would be enough to meet that test;
however, it is also possible that the court would require some type of
increased risk before it would be willing to allow the employer to suc-
ceed using that defense. In any event, the hypothetical abuse victim in
our example is unlikely to have a very strong legal case against her em-
ployer and it is even more unlikely that such a claim would be brought
in the first place.223
B. Possible Causes ofAction by the Employee- Victim or
Others if Violence Erupts
Weighing against all of the possible causes of action that an em-
ployee-victim could bring against an employer for termination is the
potential liability an employer would face if workplace violence occurred
by the employee-victim's abuser.22 ' Employers may be legally obligated to
protect their employees (including the employee-victim) from workplace
terminations could form the basis of an action for emotional distress, virtually every
employee would have a cause of action").




223. This is pure speculation on the author's part but it seems that the victim of domestic
violence has enough to worry about without adding the stressors of a lawsuit, which
would make very public something she tries to keep very private.
224. Beaver, supra note 4, at 104.
[Vol. 12:275
VICTIMIZING THE ABUSED?
domestic violence. 225 There is not much case law in this area, in part be-
cause many of these cases are settled out of court.226 However, according
to Roberta Valente, Staff Director of the American Bar Association
Commission on Domestic Violence, "courts will begin holding busi-
nesses liable if employers know about the threat of violence." 227 For
instance, if an employee obtains a protection order against an abuser and
the employer is aware of that order, or the employee seeks assistance
from her employer, some believe the employer has a duty to protect the
employee and the rest of the workplace. 28 This subpart will explore
three theories of liability: (1) workers compensation, (2) liability under
OSHA, and (3) liability under general tort principles.
1. Workers' Compensation Liability
Most states have adopted workers' compensation statutes, which
provide the exclusive remedy against an employer when an employee is
injured or killed at work.229 Workers' compensation benefits generally
pay for medical bills and lost wages resulting from workplace injuries,
without the necessity of the employee proving that the employer was
230
negligent in any way. In return for this relatively quick and easy rem-
edy, the exclusive remedy principle provides that the employee must give
up his right to sue under a tort theory in exchange for the workers'
compensation remedy. 23 '1 However, most states recognize an intentional
tort exception to the workers compensation exclusive remedy rule if the
employer acted "deliberately with the specific intent to injure the em-
ployee., 232 Courts might find an intentional tort if an employer is aware
of an employee's status as a domestic violence victim and does nothing
225. See THE WORKPLACE RESPONDS, supra note 19, at 124 ("Generally, these laws require
employers to take reasonable prompt and effective remedial or preventive actions in
response to acts or threats of violence or to known risks of violence in the work-
place.").
226. Robertson, supra note 9, at 644.
227. Id. at 645.
228. Id. This analysis cuts both ways. It could mean the employer would be liable to other
employees if violence erupts, but it also means that the employer could be liable for
not protecting the abused employee. However, if the employer terminates the em-
ployee, it is no longer in a special relationship with her, and therefore would not be
responsible for protecting her. It seems counterintuitive for an employer to fire the
domestic violence victim to protect her against her batterer, especially considering
that firing her only protects her from harm in her workplace.
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to protect the employee from the violence."' The failure of an employer
to protect employees from workplace violence when danger is known or
suspected can amount to an intentional tort.234 In such cases, workers'
compensation is not considered the exclusive remedy and employees can
proceed to file claims under the intentional tort exception.135 "Notably,
the unique character of domestic violence injuries in the workplace may
invoke the intentional tort exception, although the exception does not
apply in most incidents of random, unforeseen workplace violence. ,236
Many states also have an assault exception to the exclusive remedy
principle. Under this exception, if the attacker (whether a co-worker or
outsider) intended to injure the employee for personal reasons, the em-
ployee can sue the employer using a tort theory of liability.
237
Furthermore, some states will find that injuries caused by a battering
relationship in the workplace do not always "arise out of" the employ-
ment relationship or were not perpetrated in the course of employment,
and therefore, the employer could be liable under a tort theory rather
than the limited workers compensation remedy.
2
1
In one case, "a woman's boyfriend entered the plant where she
worked and killed her."239 Because the violence arose from the victim's
personal relationship with her boyfriend, the court held that the assault
exception applied, and therefore, the plaintiff could sue under a tort
theory.240 "Workplace domestic violence attacks, by definition, involve
attackers with personal vendettas against the victim. Therefore, in states
with an assault exception, the court could excuse a plaintiff from a
workers' compensation [claim] and permit tort or contract claims if the
victim is injured or killed on the job by a partner or ex-partner.,
241
Bypassing the exclusive remedy provision has both advantages and
disadvantages. As long as the employee can prove that the employer was
negligent in some respect, that it knew or should have known that
violence could ensue, the injured employee (or survivors of killed em-
ployees) would be better off suing under a tort theory, because the




237. Robertson, supra note 9, at 649; Comment: Walking a Tightrope, supra note 113, at
147. Obviously, the damages collectible under a tort theory (including punitive dam-
ages and damages for pain and suffering) are much more extensive than the damages
provided under the workers' compensation laws.
238. Comment: Walking a Tightrope, supra note 113, at 145.





potential damages under a tort theory are much higher than under a
workers' compensation claim.242 However, if the workplace domestic
violence was truly random and came without warning, the victims or
their survivors may prefer a workers compensation remedy, where they
would not be required to prove negligence.
2. Liability Under OSHA
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA)243 con-
tains a "general duty clause" that requires employers to provide a
workplace that is "free from recognized hazards that are causing or are
likely to cause death or serious physical harm" to employees.244 In 1992,
OSHA issued an interpretation and compliance letter noting the in-
creased attention being given to workplace criminal violence.
Although there are no specific standards addressing criminal violence in
the workplace, the OSHA interpretation letter used the general duty
246clause as a potential source of protection. Additionally, it stated:
"There is no reason to exclude from this list of hazards criminal acts of
violence which are 'recognized' as part of the nature of doing busi-
ness."247 This OSHA letter, as well as other OSHA initiatives, suggests
that an employer must take, steps to decrease workplace violence if it
wants to avoid the risk of being found in violation of OSHA. "Given
the emerging and very public reports about the prevalence of domestic
violence at the workplace, an employer would be hard pressed to explain
why such violence was not foreseeable and thus remediable under the
,,248
statute.
While OSHA does not provide for a private cause of action for
injured employees, employees may use an OSHA violation to prove neg-S 2491l
ligence per se or as evidence of negligence in separate tort actions. In
order to prove a violation of OSHAs general duty clause, the
242. Id. at 648.
243. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2000).
244. 29 U.S.C. § 65 4 (a)(1) (2000), cited in Vaughn, supra note 13, at 243; see also OSHA
FACT SHEET, supra note 7.
245. Vaughn, supra note 13, at 243.
246. Id.
247. Id. (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINI-
STRATION, OSHA Standards Interpretation and Compliance Letters, 5/131992-
Criminal Violence in the Workplace, available at http://www.osha-slc.gov/OshDoc/
Interpdata/19920513C.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2000)).
248. Id. at 244.
249. Robertson, supra note 9, at 646; see also Comment: Walking a Tightrope, supra note
113, at 163.
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following factors must be met: "'(1) the existence of a hazard likely to
cause death or serious physical harm; (2) the employer's recognition of
the hazard; (3) the availability of feasible means to abate the hazard; and
(4) the employer's failure to implement the feasible means of abate-
ment.' ,250 As will be discussed below, determining whether or not the
employer was aware of the hazard would be significant.
3. Liability Under Tort Law
In order to establish tort liability for workplace violence, a plaintiff
would have to prove three things: (1) that there were warning signs of
the violent act; (2) that if the company had been paying attention, it
would have noticed the warning signs; and (3) the company could have
minimized or prevented the violence.251 If the employer knew of the po-
tential risk and did nothing, the risk of liability increases. There are
several examples where employers have a higher risk of liability because
of increased knowledge.252 For example, in one case, the plaintiff sued
for wrongful death on behalf of an employee who was killed by a co-
worker after she ended the romantic relationship. 253 The employer was
aware that the abuser had experienced anger control problems and had
required psychological treatment in the past.254
Element two (that if the company had been paying attention, it
would have noticed the warning signs) is generally referred to as an issue
of foreseeability. Authorities are split as to whether the risk of harm is
foreseeable in these types of cases. 255 Generally, an abuser must actually
threaten an employee to harm her in the workplace and the employer
must be aware of the abuser's threat in order for the harm to be consid-
ered legally foreseeable.256 Foreseeability might also be found where the
employer knew that the abuser had harassed his victim at work before or
had come to work looking for her.
257 In Clark v. Carla Gay Dress Co. 258
on the other hand, the court found the foreseeability element was not
met when the abuser shot his victim because the plaintiff's husband did
250. Perin, supra note 71, at 391-92 (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Comm'n, 122 F.3d 437, 440 (7th Cit. 1997)).
251. Perin, supra note 71, at 371.
252. See, e.g., Panpat v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 71 P.3d 553 (Or. Ct.
App. 2003).
253. Id. at 557-58.
254. Id. at 555.
255. Perin, supra note 71, at 372; Robertson, supra note 9, at 650.
256. Robertson, supra note 9, at 650.
257. Perin, supra note 71, at 373.
258. Clark v. Carla Gay Dress Co., 342 S.E.2d 468 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
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not appear violent or angry when he entered the premises and she had
not communicated to her employer that she feared her husband.259
"Based on this case, if a woman feels threatened by a batterer, she should
inform her employer. Once notified, the employer may have a duty to
protect the employee., 260 One California case resulted in an opposite
outcome, where an ex-husband killed three co-workers and badly in-
jured six others in his successful attempt to kill his ex-wife. Because she
had told her employer that he had threatened to kill her at work, the
employer was liable to the tune of two million dollars.261
Another case where foreseeability was the pivotal issue was Guerrero
v. Memorial Medical Center of East Texas,262 where the plaintiff was shot
by her abuser. The factors the court looked at to determine foreseeability
were: (1) that the plaintiff had requested a security escort into work; (2)
the shooter had fled from officers the morning of the shooting; (3) tes-
timony by a security officer that security should have been increased in
response to the knowledge of the domestic problems; (4) entry into the
daily log that the abuser was stalking his wife; and (5) testimony by a
security officer that he should have called the police when he spotted the
husband so that an arrest could be made.263
Furthermore, "[i]n cases where the perpetrator is also an employee,
a plaintiff may have legitimate negligent hiring, negligent retention or
negligent supervision claims against the employer if the employer is
aware of potentially violent applicants or employees., 26 Abusive inti-
mate partners working together could also expose an employer to
liability under a duty to warn theory.265 "The employer's duty to prevent
a person from injuring another arises when the employee stands in a
special relationship to the person whose conduct needs to be controlled
or to the victim, and the harm to the victim is foreseeable."' 66 For in-
stance, there would be a duty to warn when an employee makes a
specific, rather than generalized, threat and the target of the threat is
known and is also an employee.267 There would also be a duty to warn a
259. Id. at 4 72.
260. Robertson, supra note 9, at 650.
261. See Perin, supra note 71, at 368.
262. Guerrero v. Memorial Medical Center of East Texas, 938 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.
1997).
263. Id. at 793-94; see also Comment: Walking a Tightrope, supra note 113, at 158.
264. Robertson, supra note 9, at 650; see also Comment: Walking a Tightrope, supra note
113, at 159; Perin, supra note 71, at 380, 383-84 (discussing a case where the police
department had taken away the abuser's weapon after it learned that he pointed his
city-owned gun at his wife at her workplace but then later returned it).
265. Perin, supra note 71, at 376.
266. Id. at 376-77.
267. Id. at 378.
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battered employee if her abuser told her supervisor that he was going to
kill her at work.
268
Some have suggested a new standard for determining which risks
are foreseeable when dealing with workplace domestic violence. "An eas-
ier standard to meet, the foreseeability requirement could be satisfied by
employees' expressed fears, by a record of threatening behavior by a po-
tential perpetrator, or by the societal prevalence of workplace domestic
violence in general." 269 It is doubtful courts would go this far in deter-
mining foreseeability; indeed, such a standard would require a finding
that domestic violence in the workplace is always foreseeable.
Another tort theory under which liability could possibly attach is
the assumption of duty theory. Under this theory, an employer may have
a duty to protect the employee if the employer assumes the duty to pro-
tect its employees from the criminal acts of third parties.27° Under the
voluntary assumption theory, an employer assumes a duty to protect
employees through implied or express promises. An employer can as-
sume a duty to protect by expressly or implicitly promising to provide
security for employees or by actually providing security.71 In several
cases, an employer who expressly or implicitly agreed to protect an em-
ployee from violent acts by a third party was held liable for failing to
protect the employee when the employee was injured by the third
272party.
On the other hand, some courts refuse to use this theory to find li-
ability. For instance, in one case, Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, Inc.,
273
the employer was held not liable for injuries to an employee caused by
an attack by her boyfriend in the parking lot of her workplace. The
court stated that although the employer owed a duty to the employee to
keep the workplace safe, the employee's failure to request a guard to es-
cort her to her car resulted in her assumption of the risk of her
boyfriend's attack.
268. Id. at 379.
269. Robertson, supra note 9, at 651.
270. Perin, supra note 71, at 376.
271. Id. at 375-76.
272. See Comment: Walking a Tightrope, supra note 113, at 149-50. Some believe that the
risk of exposure to liability for assumption of a duty to protect undermines any in-
centive the employer may have to implement security measures. "Overall, the
unpredictability of cases involving the voluntary assumption of a duty to protect em-
ployees from violence in the workplace has an undesirable effect." Id. at 150 (citation
omitted).
273. Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, Inc., 470 S.E.2d 474, 477 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).




Even considering all of these theories, it seems unlikely that the
employer would be liable under the facts of the scenario discussed in this
Article. Thus far, courts have not found that violence by an abuser was
foreseeable when the only "threat" was simply knowledge that the em-
ployee was in an abusive relationship. Based on the case law thus far,
such a result seems unlikely. Accordingly, it is unlikely that, without
some further threat by the abuser, a court would find liability if the
abuser came to the workplace and committed some violent act. Of
course, how the employer acted before, during, and after the violent act
would all be part of the analysis.
C Assessing the Financial Risks
While it might take a complex statistical analysis to determine the
relative risks of liability by either the terminated employee or the poten-
tial victims of workplace violence, there are a couple of conclusions that
can. be drawn from the above discussion on legal liability. First, if an
employer terminates the victim of domestic violence, it has already and
certainly caused the harm. However, it is uncertain whether many
women would attempt to sue, and, if such an attempt was made, it is
uncertain how successful such an attempt would be, as was discussed
above.275 Nevertheless, suffice it to say that a lawsuit brought by a termi-
nated employee is more likely in this scenario than one brought by
potential victims of workplace violence if the employee is not termi-
nated. In order to have liability for not firing the domestic abuse victim,
there first would have to be some type of violence perpetrated at the
workplace by the victim's abuser. While this is possible, it is not all that
likely. On the other hand, if such an event occurs, it is much more likely
that a lawsuit would follow and it is this author's opinion that liability
for such an event would be just as likely, if not more so, to attach than
for the termination of the victim of domestic violence. Moreover, the
financial damages are certain to be higher, especially if the violence re-
sulted in an employee's death.276 Regardless of the action taken by the
employer (firing the employee or not), there are liability concerns. Basi-
cally, employers have to pick which liability they are more willing to
incur. As one attorney stated: "Legally, you may not always win, but
[you have] to protect the majority of employees."277
275. See supra Part II.A.
276. See Perin supra note 261 and accompanying text (citing to liability of two million
dollars).
277. Martha Neil, Safety Begins at Work, 89 ABA JouitAsL 36, 36 (Oct. 2003).
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III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Having analyzed the legal issues surrounding the decision to termi-
nate (or not) the employee-victim, there are just as many policy issues to
consider, many of which are predicated on some of the legal analysis and
conclusions discussed above. This Part will analyze the policy considera-
tions supporting each side of the issue, and will hopefully serve to
eliminate the misconception that this scenario raises any easy solutions.
A. Considerations Weighing Against Termination
As stated earlier in this Article, punishing the victim of domestic
abuse by terminating her simply does not sit right with most people.
Doing so is seen as "victimizing the abused."2 7' After the female em-
ployee in our hypothetical was terminated, it is likely that she arrived
home only to be beaten because she had been terminated. Such a realiza-
tion is more than a little troubling. One could even say that by
terminating the victim, the employer is furthering the abuse from which-- 279
the victim suffers.
In addition to the troubling nature of such a decision, there are
many factors that make the decision to terminate the domestic abuse
victim seem inherently unjustifiable. One such factor is that, had other
facts been present in the analysis, it is likely that the employee-victim
could have had a successful cause of action for her termination. For in-
stance, if this scenario had occurred more often, it is possible that the
employee-victim could have a disparate impact sex discrimination
claim.' If the employer was unionized, it is very likely that an arbitrator/ I 281
would have ordered her reinstatement, as well as backpay. Should the
fact that an arbitrator would likely not find "just cause" for her termina-
tion be a consideration? Possibly. Certainly, a decision to terminate that
is not made for "just cause" seems inherently unfair. On the other hand,
278. See THE WORKPLACE RESPONDS, supra note 19, at 127 ("In responding to employees'
complaints, employers must ensure that women are not additionally penalized after
being battered by being subjected to adverse job consequences.").
279. See Runge & Hearn, supra note 1, at 822 ("Batterers extend their pattern of abuse
and control to the workplace by threatening a woman's ability to keep her job, using
the employer as an accomplice in their abuse. The loss of economic independence of-
ten leads a domestic violence victim to remain in the cycle of violence.").
280. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
281. Supra Part II.A.3.
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"just cause" to an arbitrator might be a much more stringent standard
than one would think.282
Furthermore, the consideration of the public's interest might also
reveal that termination is unwarranted. The public has an interest in
employers addressing domestic violence. Certainly it is a debatable issue
whether and to what extent the cost of social problems, such as domestic
violence, should be borne by business.283 But one can see how failing to
address workplace domestic violence may force more women out of the
workforce, thus increasing the demand for public assistance and social
services. Firing the victims would also harm the public's interest. By de-
priving or preventing women from achieving the economic
independence needed to leave their batterers, employers may unknow-
ingly force victims back into their abusers' lives, thereby perpetuating
the cycle of violence.284 Commentators argue that employers have a pub-
lic interest obligation to assist victims of domestic abuse because "abuse
perpetuates the societal subordination and objectification of women., 21'
Employers should also consider the magnitude of the threat of
workplace violence in order to justify any termination decision. For in-
stance, in one frightening situation, the abusive husband of an employee
of Pitney Bowes showed up at work in the parking lot with a gun. 286 Ac-
cordingly, the company fired her to keep the rest of the workplace
safe. 87 In that situation, most would agree that she posed a significant
threat to the workplace. In the hypothetical at hand, however, there was
no evidence that the employee's abusive partner had made any threats
directed at the workplace. Should that matter? Certainly, the law does
not require that the employer undergo a "direct threat" analysis (unless,
of course, there is a disability issue) 2 but a decision to terminate is
282. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
283. Vaughn, supra note 13, at 246.
284. Robertson, supra note 9, at 638-39.
[I]t has become quite apparent that the victim of domestic violence in the
state of Washington will find that she has very few sources of job protec-
tion. This is ironic at best, a human tragedy, possibly leading to death, at
worst. Emerging research and common sense suggest that a woman who
cannot find a source of economic sustenance independent of her abusing
partner is more likely to return to that partner. Given the very real and per-
sonal costs of abuse, we cannot be long in coming to the conclusion that
this is a problem for every woman, every person, and every employer in our
economy.
Vaughn, supra note 13, at 246.
285. Robertson, supra note 9, at 654 (citations omitted).
286. Neil, supra note 277.
287. Id.
288. Supra Part II.A.4.d.
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much more difficult to justify if the risk of harm to the workplace is
minimal.289
B. Considerations Justifying Termination
Despite the inherent unfairness of victimizing the abused, there is a
potential liability risk if the employee remains employed. Should an
employer have to bear this risk? Some would argue that from a business
perspective, it is easier to terminate her than run the risk of violence.
Most employers (if given the choice) would rather defend a wrongful
termination lawsuit than a wrongful death lawsuit. Not only is the po-
tential liability for a death in the workplace much more significant than
for a wrongful termination, but also, an employer's conscience (or, more
specifically, the consciences of the employer's decision makers) might
make it very difficult to run the risk of keeping an employee-victim em-
ployed once the employer is made aware of the potential risks.290 These
types of scenarios raise awareness of the "internal conflicts in an em-
ployer's interest in productivity, safety, and workforce stability."
291
Furthermore, there are other areas of the law (namely, our disability
laws) that address situations where an employer must make a decision
between the rights and interests of one employee versus the rights and
interests of the rest of the workforce. Drawing an analogy to the ADA
favors the employer's right to terminate. Under the ADA, the Supreme
Court has recently held that a disabled employee does not have to be
transferred to a job that he could perform with his restrictions if such
transfer would violate the seniority rights of other employees.
2 92
Drawing an analogy to that holding, one could argue that a com-
pany should not allow the interests of one employee-the domestic
abuse victim-to trump the safety interests of the rest of the workforce.
Of course, a distinction can be made between the issue discussed here
and the ADA example. In the ADA context, allowing a disabled em-
ployee to bump an employee with more seniority out of his position will
certainly and necessarily interfere with the rights of the non-disabled
employee. In our example, the likelihood that the retention of the fe-
male employee will have any adverse impact on the rest of the workforce
is unknown at worst and unlikely at best. Nevertheless, the issue is an
289. See infra Part IV.
290. Hayes, Outten & Steer, supra note 11, at 313-14.
291. Vaughn, supra note 13, at 245-46.
292. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 391; see also Sandy Andri Kopoulos & Theo E.M. Gould, Note,
Living in Harmony? Reasonable Accommodations, Employee Expectations and US Air-
ways, Inc. v Barnett, 20 HoFsrRA L A. AND EMp. L.J. 345, 358-59 (2003).
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important one and should not be dismissed lightly without looking at
the seriousness of the threat. I would hypothesize that employers who
make the decision to terminate the abuse victim do so in large part be-
cause they are unwilling to sacrifice the safety of their other employees.
Finally, it is unrealistic to discuss the normative goal of fairness with-
out considering the financial concerns of the company. The amount of
money it would take to adequately protect the workplace is an important
factor for any employer. Sometimes, outside security consultants may be
required if the threatening behavior seems to be worsening. Some employ-
ers relocate employee-victims to alternative job locations, which can be very
costly. This accommodation would entail "keeping the new location ...
confidential even among coworkers, eliminating the employee-victim's
name from phone and electronic mail lists and protecting the privacy and
confidentiality of the employee-victim under all circumstances."293 If the
amount of money required for adequate security, lengthy paid leaves of ab-
sence or relocation expenses put an undue financial burden on the
employer, the decision to terminate seems more justified.
C. Is There a Middle Ground?
This Article has discussed the policy issues of these decisions as if
there are only two possible outcomes-termination or do nothing. Be-
fore an employer considers termination, however, hopefully it has
considered other, less drastic measures. Certainly, prevention is a great
first step. Employers should encourage employees to report threats of
abuse so perpetrators may be stopped from causing future injury to the
employee-victim or other employees.
Training employees and supervisors to recognize signs of domestic
violence is an important preventive measure.2 " There are a couple of
examples where proper training could have prevented a violent outburst.
In one example, employees noticed a co-worker threatening his wife,
who also worked with him. Because his threats were "so open and far-
fetched," the employees stopped believing him-until he shot his wife
in the parking lot at work.295 In another example, an abuser called his
victim at work ten times a day and came into work about three times a
day. The company did nothing and one day, he came into the office and
shot and killed her.296
293. Comment: Walking a Tightrope, supra note 113, at 186.
294. Perin, supra note 71, at 396-97.
295. Id. at 397.
296. Id.
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Conversely, some employers are willing to go the extra mile. One
example involved an employee who was trying to leave her batterer.
Management gave her paid leave and use of its vans and storage space
297
during the move. Similarly, when another employer realized that one
of its employees was being harassed with phone calls at work, the em-
ployer gave her money and time off to obtain a restraining order.2 " The
accommodations were successful and the employee is now a very loyal
employee.9  In order to assist abuse victims in avoiding the debilitating
effects of domestic violence, employers should attempt to help the em-
ployee-victim before considering termination.
However, it is interesting and significant to note that almost all of
the possible accommodations an employer could offer assume that the
employee-victim is willing to accept the employer's assistance. But what
if she is not willing to leave her abuser or accept any help from her em-
ployer, as is often the case?300 Then the employer is in a very precarious
situation. All of the assistance it can offer may be fruitless if she is un-
willing to follow the employer's requests and recommendations.
So the question becomes: should it matter then that she is unwill-
ing to leave her abuser? Some believe it does. For instance, in one real-
life example, a female employee of Pitney Bowes was in an abusive rela-
tionship. The company, in an attempt to be very accommodating,
offered to help her leave her husband and move to another state where
the company had an office. She refused this generous accommodation
because she would not leave her spouse. Accordingly, the company fired
her because it did not feel that it could keep the workplace safe with her
still employed there.0 1
However, weighing against this policy-that an employer should
only terminate the female employee if she is unwilling to accept help-
is the reality of domestic violence. As we saw above when we discussed
the learned helplessness theory and Battered Women's Syndrome (as well
as the other theories discussed), it is very difficult for a woman to leave
her batterer, for very understandable reasons. Therefore, it seems un-
just to condition termination on her willingness to leave. In the next
part, I will attempt to resolve the conflict between all of these policy
considerations.
297. Robertson, supra note 9, at 656.
298. Id. at 656-57 (citation omitted).
299. Id. at 657 (citations omitted).
300. See BERRY, supra note 24; supra Part II.A.
301. Neil, supra note 277.




One goal of this piece was to raise the reader's awareness to the fact
that there are two compelling sides to this debate. However, it was also
my goal to provide proposed solutions for handling this conflict when
domestic violence potentially threatens the workplace. As stated in the
Introduction, in this particular hypothetical, I believe termination was
not justified from a policy perspective. On the other hand, from a legal
perspective, the decision is much more justifiable. Based on the facts of
the hypothetical, the employer is likely to survive a wrongful discharge
claim brought by the terminated employee. 3 As was discussed above, °
the most plausible cause of action she might have is a violation of public
policy claim, depending on the state in which she and the employer are
located. 305 However, in order to bring this claim, she must be able to
point to some public policy that her actions furthered, which would be a
difficult burden for her to meet.30 6 The employee-victim in our example
is unlikely to have a very strong legal case against her employer, and it is
even more unlikely that such a claim would be brought in the first place.
Furthermore, from a legal perspective, the potential liability if vio-
lence did ensue in the workplace at the hands of the batterer would be
much greater. The chance of the condition being met (that violence en-
sues) is unlikely, but if it does occur, the potential damages would be
significantly higher than they would be for the damages that would be
awarded to the terminated employee, even if her claim was successful.
Accordingly, from a legal perspective alone, it cannot be said that the
employer's decision was illegal or even that it was legally "unsound." In
fact, one could argue that by terminating the employee, the employer
took the lesser of two evils-potential wrongful termination lawsuit
rather than a possible wrongful death suit.
However, legal decisions are not and should not be made in a vac-
uum. Addressing the soundness of the employer's decision (and perhaps,
more importantly, the fairness of the decision) based on the policy con-
siderations leads to a very different (and much more complicated)
analysis. As stated above, from a policy perspective, the employer did
not make the right decision. This part will seek to not only support my
conclusion that the decision to terminate was wrong from a policy per-
spective, it will also attempt to outline the boundaries that should be
applied when making such a decision.
303. See supra Part II.A.
304. Id.
305. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
306. See supra Part II.A.3.a.
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This part will make three conclusions. First, there are circumstances
where termination would be completely unjust. Second, there are cases
where termination would be warranted. And third, there are circum-
stances, such as this one, which require further analysis. In the end,
however, I believe it is clear that the hypothetical decision to terminate
was unjustified in light of the particular facts presented.
A. When Termination Is Not Justified
Termination would be completely unwarranted if the employee-
victim voluntarily approached her employer, informing her managers of
the risk of harm from her abuser, asking for assistance in alleviating the
risk of harm, and expressing a willingness to do whatever the employer
thought was appropriate to limit the workplace risk. Even this conclu-
sion, however, must be tempered with an analysis of how much
assistance would be required to mitigate the risk of harm to the abuse
victim and to the rest of the workplace. In other words, accommoda-
tions such as helping the employee-victim locate an abuse victim shelter,
giving her some amount of time off work to relocate herself, and provid-
ing minor workplace security 0 7 are reasonable, and are consistent with
what other companies have done and with accommodations suggested
in the proposed and recently enacted legislation.08 However, if an em-
ployer determined that the only assistance that would be effective would
be to spend a great deal of money relocating the employee-victim to an-
other city and providing her another job, or providing around the clock
armed security guards at the workplace, such accommodations may
likely pose an "undue hardship" on the employer, parlaying the language
of the ADA. °9 The undue hardship standard used by the ADA is a help-
ful standard to borrow because it takes into account the relative wealth
of the employer in relation to the accommodation requested or re-
quired."'
307. Minor workplace security could consist of offering her an escort to her car or making
sure that doors remain locked. THE WORKPLACE REsPONDS, supra note 19, at 87 (list-
ing these and other suggested safety measures).
308. See sources cited supra Part II.A. 1.
309. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
310. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(ii); Roberts v. Kindercare Learning Centers, Inc. 86 F.3d
844, 864 (8th Cit. 1996). For support of using such a standard, see supra Part II.A. 1
(discussing proposed legislation that uses the same standard).
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B. When Termination Is Warranted
Of course, if the woman was unwilling to accept the employer's
help and to leave her batterer, the accommodations mentioned above
would be futile.3" Then, the employer is left with a more difficult
choice. If the employer is fairly certain that the risk of harm is signifi-
cant (based on reports of threats made by the abuser or some other
evidence that he might come into the workplace to harm her), it can
either take on the very significant burden of attempting to provide
around-the-clock security for its workplace (which would likely lead to
an unreasonable financial hardship) or it can terminate the employee-
victim. In that scenario, where the risk of violence is high, and the
employee-victim is unwilling to take steps to mitigate the risk, termina-
tion would be warranted.
12
This conclusion is based in part on the fact that she is unwilling to
leave her abuser, which is troubling when one considers the dynamics of
domestic violence relationships.313 However, an employer in this situa-
tion is really left with no other viable alternative. If it does not terminate
her, there is a significant risk that other employees could be harmed. With
knowledge of a threat made, it would have a difficult time defending that
311. For instance, suppose that the victim tells her employer that not only will she stay
with her abuser, but she also refuses to agree to notify her employer if he threatens to
come into the workplace to harm her or to report a threat he might make against
other employees. In such a case, not only is termination warranted-it is the only
smart decision.
312. If termination is warranted, there are other peripheral issues that an employer would
need to address. The first is whether severance pay is warranted. Some believe that if
it was the right decision to terminate her, she should not receive a severance payment.
These people believe that it is the victim's fault that she is in this situation and the
fact that she is unwilling to cooperate (and thus faces termination) is dispositive. But
knowing what we know about domestic violence, such thinking is both insensitive
and wrong. It was necessary to use her willingness to accept help as the litmus test,
but it should not be assumed that she was somehow at fault for being unwilling or
unable to leave. See supra Part I.A. Furthermore, from a strictly practical perspective,
if an employer offered severance because it was forced to terminate a victim of domes-
tic violence, it could get her to sign a release agreement, thereby avoiding any liability
for the termination.
The other issue the employer would need to address if it terminated the em-
ployee is how to make sure such an action would not cause a violent outburst by the
abuser. Companies with a workplace violence team that includes a forensic psycholo-
gist should gather as much information as possible about the abuser to conduct an
analysis of whether he poses a risk to the workplace even if his victim is not there. In
general, however, most abusers are not violent to anyone besides their loved ones, as
ironic as that seems.
313. See supra Part I.A.
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course of action.314 Preventing the violence, in light of the victim's un-
willingness to cooperate or leave her abuser, is also unreasonable,
because doing so would be prohibitively expensive. Accordingly, if the
employer did not draw the line based on her willingness to leave, and in
light of the above argument that keeping her employed would seriously
threaten the rest of the workplace (because of her unwillingness to miti-
gate the potential risk by following the employer's recommendations),
the only other choice would be a rule that every domestic violence vic-
tim is terminated. Not only is such a rule insensitive, unfair, possibly
illegal, and offensive, it could also result in a slippery slope, mandating
the termination of every employee who poses a risk to the workplace,
including employees being stalked by unknown assailants.
Some might argue that termination is unwarranted even when the
risk of harm is significant and the employee-victim is unwilling to ac-
cept help. However, many of the reasons that termination is otherwise
unjust would fall away in cases where the abuser poses a real and signifi-
cant threat to the workplace. For instance, even assuming the employee-
victim did have a cause of action for termination, it is likely that the
employer would be able to defend such a claim by showing that it had
no choice but to fire her so that it could protect the rest of workplace
against the substantial risk of workplace violence by the batterer. Fur-
thermore, if faced with a choice between termination of a domestic
violence victim and a very real threat of workplace violence that could
likely result in the death of one or more employees, many who once dis-
approved of this finding may change their minds.
C. Proposal to Terminate Only If Direct Threat
Having said that, the pivotal issue is whether every domestic vio-
lence victim poses a significant threat to the workplace. It was argued
earlier that a court would not likely jump to that conclusion and we
should not either. This third conclusion addresses the specific hypo-
thetical used in this Article. An employer should not terminate every
employee-victim if the employer does not foresee a real and significant
risk of a violent outburst by the victim's abuser. In other words, the
question "how great is the risk of harm?" must be relevant. A helpful
way of analyzing this risk is by once again borrowing from the law of the
ADA: the direct threat analysis. 3 16 Under the direct threat test in the
314. See supra Part II.B.3.
315. See supra Part II.B.3.
316. See supra Part II.A.4.d.
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ADA context, an employer can terminate a disabled employee if keeping
him/her employed poses a direct threat to the employee or the rest of
the workforce. As stated above, the direct threat analysis requires meet-
ing four factors: (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the likelihood that the
potential harm will occur; (3) the nature and severity of the potential
harm; and (4) the imminence of the potential harm.317 This standard is
very difficult to meet.318
In the immediate hypothetical, in order to justify termination, this
analysis would require a finding that not only is it likely that the abuser
will come to the workplace to abuse her but that such a threat is immi-
nent. Without any information that the abuser had made threats
directed toward the workplace (and if she in fact denies that he has done
so), the direct threat test would likely not be met. One thing we do
know about abusers is that they are likely to keep their abuse very pri-319
vate. Accordingly, in the hypothetical at hand, because there is no
evidence that the employee-victim's abuser made threats toward the
workplace, it is very unlikely her abuser would come into the workplace
to harm her or anyone else. Because the direct threat test could not be
met, I believe termination was unwarranted.
To be sure, using the direct threat standard is not required legally
and some might question why an employer should keep an employee
who is not willing to accept the employer's proposed accommodations,
even without a direct threat finding. However, there are several reasons
why an employer should limit terminations by using the direct threat
analysis. First, termination does disproportionately affect women, even
if such a conclusion requires a greater universe of women to analyze
than will normally be present in one employer's workplace.3 20 Termina-
tion also "victimizes the abused," leaving the employee-victim both
beaten and penniless, so to speak, and results in the further subordina-
tion of women. 321 Furthermore, without a direct threat of harm, it is
317. Laden & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 264; see also Hayes, Outten & Steer, supra note
11, at 305 ("The threat has to be a significant-not a hypothetical or mere poten-
tial-risk. The risk has to be actual and imminent, not prospective or long-term. The
risk must have an objective basis and cannot be conjecture."); Beaver, supra note 4
(noting how narrow the exception is in some cases); Ogletree, supra note 206 (citing
Koshko v. General Electric Co., No. 01-C-5069, (N.D. Ill. March 20, 2003) (hold-
ing that an employee who made threats to kill a co-worker poses a direct threat)).
318. Supra Part II.A.5.d.
319. BERRY, supra note 24.
320. See supra Part II.A. .b.
321. Domestic violence perpetuates the societal subordination and objectification of
women, and employers should not further that effect by victimizing the employee-
victim. Robertson, supra note 9, at 654 ("Acts of domestic violence are gender-based.
By controlling and victimizing their partners, men intend to 'intimidate and terrorize'
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unlikely a court would find an employer liable if violence did ensue.322
Finally, without a direct threat of harm, an employer should be able to
protect the workplace without suffering an undue burden. In other
words, if the abuser has made no threats to come into the workplace, it
is probably not necessary to hire around the clock security guards. In-
stead, it may only be necessary to monitor the employee-victim's actions
and implement some common-sense and simple security measures. By
using the direct threat analysis, employers are only forced to "victimize
the abused" when they really are left with no viable alternative. Even if
troubled by the fact that the employee-victim is unwilling to follow the
employer's recommendations, it is important to remember how difficult
it is for her to do so, especially when those recommendations will likely




There is no doubt that domestic violence remains one of society's
most pressing problems. Employers versed in the risks of workplace vio-
lence are also legitimately concerned that domestic violence could spill
over into the workplace. Making decisions as to how to deal with these
situations is very difficult and should not be made lightly, without con-
sideration of all of the risks of liability, as well as the broader social goal
of helping domestic violence victims, rather than further harming them.
Certainly, the Illinois statute protecting domestic violence victims
in employment32 4 seems to be a step in the right direction, in part be-
cause it forces employers to analyze some of the same considerations
suggested here. It is unclear whether similar statutes will follow and if
so, what the impact of those statutes will be. As to whether such a stat-
ute should be enacted on a federal level, that question is left for another
day. t
all women, reinforcing the traditional view of women's subordinate familial role.")
(citations omitted).
322. See supra Part II.B.3.
323. See supra Part I.A.
324. See supra Part II.A. 1.
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